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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Japan’s nuclear weapons policy has long enjoyed a stable, if somewhat internally inconsistent, 
equilibrium.  Anti-proliferation efforts co-exist with reliance upon the United States’ nuclear 
deterrent, alongside dependence on a nuclear energy program robust enough to potentially 
support nuclear weapons capability.  These policies have been promoted and maintained by 
Japan’s bureaucracy rather than by political bargains, with their bureaucratic proponents 
separately stovepiped rather than organized into a coherent whole.  But new developments 
appear to leave Japan’s nuclear security policy – and its relations with the U.S. over this 
policy – in flux.  New threats and changing public attitudes are gradually eroding taboos on 
nuclear weapons.  New or newly energized political actors stand to amplify the impact of 
such public opinion shifts. A more actively nuclear Japan could destabilize the U.S.-Japan 
alliance, raise nuclear weapons levels in Asia, and undercut Japan’s role as a model 
nonnuclear ally; on the other hand, new anti-nuclear sentiment could hinder ongoing U.S.-
Japan nuclear dialogue.   
This report first assesses the bureaucratically led status quo of Japanese nuclear policy and 
how its stakeholders have evolved.  It then turns to an examination of newly emerging 
political influences on security policy, including nuclear policy – the Democratic Party of 
Japan (DPJ) governments of 2009-2012, the new Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) 
administration led by Prime Minister Abe, apparently rising tides of nationalism, and the 
anti-nuclear-power movement. 
Though concerns about increased politicization are certainly justified, we find that these 
actors are less willing or able than they appear to dislodge Japan from its non-nuclear status 
quo.  Finally, the catastrophic nuclear accident at the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power 
plant following the Great Eastern Japan Earthquake (GEJE) in March 2011 sharply 
reanimated previously latent opposition to nuclear power, which may yet be redirected 
towards nuclear weapons as well. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Japan and the United States are arguably each other’s most important security 
partners.  Since the two countries’ signing of their Mutual Security Treaty in 1951, Japan has 
hosted U.S. military bases critical to U.S. strategic interests in the Asia-Pacific region and 
beyond.  In return, the U.S. has committed itself to defend Japan from external 
aggression.  In the area of nuclear weapons, however, Japan’s alliance relationship with the 
United States has always been an uneasy one.  While Japanese citizens have long been wary 
of nuclear weapons and Japan’s policymakers have consistently pursued nuclear 
disarmament throughout the postwar period, Japan relies on the U.S.’ nuclear deterrent for 
its own security.  Meanwhile, Japan has aggressively pursued the development of a civil 
nuclear power industry in order to lower its dependence on oil imports as its energy source, 
all at the same time.  As a result, Japan possesses one of the world’s most advanced civil 
nuclear energy programs, as well as technological sophistication that would allow Tokyo to 
weaponize its civil nuclear power capability in a relatively short amount of time. In other 
words, Japan’s post-World War II nuclear policy is a set of three separate policies that have 
been bound by the norm of renunciation of nuclear weapons—the self-image that continues 
to define Japan today.  And in recent years, the tension among these strands of nuclear 
policy has grown only more complex.   
Since the end of the Cold War, there has been a gradual but significant evolution in how 
Japanese citizens and policymakers perceive their country’s physical security and what they 
perceive to be legitimate responses to security threats.  As the only country ever exposed to 
nuclear attack, a core part of Japan’s postwar identity has been its steadfast maintenance of a 
non-nuclear policy – despite its technological capabilities.  Indeed, its strong advocacy for 
nuclear disarmament has been a major foreign policy priority.  Japanese citizens and 
policymakers alike have long resisted robust military capabilities and nuclear weapons in 
particular. 
But changing public attitudes and the emergence of new threats have begun to open a once-
taboo dialogue about Japan’s own nuclear capabilities.  Japanese citizens, responding to 
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provocations by North Korea and to increasingly sensationalistic media coverage of North 
Korea and China, are developing a sense of insecurity that leads them to question Japan’s 
non-nuclear status quo. North Korea’s covert nuclear development program and the 
international community’s persistent inability to convince Pyongyang to renounce its nuclear 
capabilities have become immediate enough security concerns to prompt many Japanese 
citizens to rethink their resistance toward nuclear weapons.  Meanwhile, the rapid 
modernization of Chinese military capabilities, particularly in the areas of air and naval 
forces, has made that country’s strategic forces a greater security concern for Japan in the 
long-term.  Ideological resistance to nuclear weapons is also fading along with the World 
War II generation.   
At the same time, the catastrophic nuclear accident at the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power 
plant following the Great Eastern Japan Earthquake (GEJE) in March 2011 created a 
completely different dynamic in Japan, particularly among the public.  Not only the 
magnitude of the accident itself but also the incompetence demonstrated by the leadership in 
power at the time in responding to the accident and its aftermath planted a deep sense of 
anxiety regarding the desirability of nuclear power as Japan’s energy source.  This has 
forcefully reactivated Japan’s nuclear “allergy,” leading to a nation-wide grassroots 
movement against nuclear power, let alone weapons, and the particular groups advocating 
reduced dependence on nuclear power are also often the same groups advocating nuclear 
disarmament.  The GEJE may have a lasting impact on how Japan views its own safety and 
security, what measures it is willing to pursue to achieve these, and the place of the U.S.-
Japan alliance in pursuing these, especially with regard to the nuclear components of these 
security arrangements (perhaps including nuclear-powered instruments of security other than 
weapons themselves, such as the aircraft carrier now home-ported in Yokosuka).  The GEJE 
represents a “formative experience” or “critical juncture” that resets the trajectory of public 
and policymaker opinion and thus remains influential long after the event itself has passed. 
Similar “exogenous shocks” in recent years – the 1991 Gulf War and the 1995 Kobe 
Earthquake in particular – have had clear impacts on Japanese security consciousness and 
policy lasting a decade or more.  
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Recent changes among elite political actors and in the policymaking process political-process 
only stand to amplify the impact of such public opinion shifts.  The Democratic Party of 
Japan (DPJ) formed Japan’s first semi-durable government not controlled by the long-ruling 
Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) from 2009 to 2012, during which time successive prime 
ministerial administrations aimed to suppress bureaucratic influence and politicize security 
policy, as well as to institute durable reforms that would preserve a lesser role for 
bureaucrats even under future non-DPJ governments.   During this period, the center-right 
LDP, which had governed for more than 50 years, suddenly found itself a small opposition 
party with incentive to re-tool as a conservative party with a more aggressive security 
policy.  The tables turned in late 2012, with the LDP returning to power, but led by a Prime 
Minister, in Shinzou Abe, who also seems unusually intent on imposing political influence 
on security policy, often from a comparatively nationalist perspective.  More generally, the 
emergence of a more genuinely competitive party system in Japan – including, lately, a 
challenge from the new, populist, and right-wing nationalist Japan Restoration Party (JRP) – 
has newly exposed politicians to public-opinion pressure and increased voter 
leverage.   Public opinion has always been crucial in nuclear and security policy, but these 
changes may make security policy more thoroughly politicized and volatile than before, just 
as the Japanese public, responding to provocations from North Korea, may be acquiring a 
heightened sense of insecurity and in turn warming to the idea of nuclear weapons.   
These developments appear to leave Japan’s nuclear security policy – and its relations with 
the U.S. over this policy – in flux.  Japan’s nuclear policy remains compartmentalized 
between “dependence on nuclear deterrence,” “pursuit of nuclear disarmament” and 
“support of a safe but robust civil nuclear power industry.”  In the foreign and security 
policy areas, given the heightened level of concerns for North Korea’s nuclear program, 
Japan’s dependence on U.S. extended deterrence is greater and more explicit than ever, while 
Japan also remains committed to its nuclear disarmament goals.  Domestically, however, the 
public is wary of nuclear power, presenting a great challenge for the government as it 
continues to pursue an energy policy that necessitates maintaining an advanced civil nuclear 
energy sector.   
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To date, when the nuclear issue has been raised in private discussions between U.S. and 
Japanese security policy specialists, the Japanese side has continued to assure its U.S. 
counterparts that its going nuclear would be unadvisable from a strategic point of view, and 
therefore unlikely. This represents the bureaucratically led, policy-driven (as opposed to 
politics-driven) status quo.  But the U.S. can no longer assume that such strategic 
calculations are the sole driver of Japan’s nuclear policy.  Japan’s non-nuclear status quo is 
also held in place by less strategically rational political and public opinion elements, some of 
which may be changing their positions, and all of which necessarily inject more potential for 
volatility than when bureaucrats set policy more autonomously. 
A more actively nuclear Japan could destabilize the U.S.-Japan alliance, raise nuclear 
weapons levels in Asia, and undercut Japan’s role as a model nonnuclear ally. On the other 
hand, the reemergence of anti-nuclear sentiment could create a political environment that 
undercuts the ongoing U.S.-Japan nuclear dialogue.   Understanding how these opposing 
trends combine to shape Japan’s nuclear security consciousness will be valuable for U.S. 
policymakers and senior military leaders who continue to constructively engage their 
Japanese counterparts in a wide range of policy dialogues.  
This report first assesses the bureaucratically led status quo of Japanese nuclear policy.  It 
identifies the separate and partly contradictory sub-components of that policy and the 
stakeholders, mostly bureaucratic, who have helped cultivate these sub-component policies 
while keeping them relatively autonomous from each other.  As Japan’s geo-political 
environment has changed, the relationships among these sub-components and their 
respective stakeholders has only grown more complex.  The report then turns to an 
examination of newly emerging political influences on security policy, including nuclear 
policy.  Though concerns about increased politicization are certainly justified, we find that in 
practice, the various actors in a position to politicize security policy, and thereby to detach 
nuclear policy from its status quo, have not held and do not hold as significant potential to 
make an impact as might have been anticipated.  This is true for security policy in general, 
and the bar is set even higher for nuclear weapons policy in particular.  We briefly discuss 
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the 2009-2012 DPJ government as a recent “most likely candidate” to politicize security 
policy, one that ultimately proved willing but unable to do so, and then turn to more current 
and ongoing potential sources of security policy politicization, including the new LDP 
administration led by Prime Minister Abe, the emergence of such new parties as the JRP and 
an apparently rising tide of nationalism more broadly, the anti-nuclear-power movement, 
and more general changes in public opinion toward nuclear power. 
NUCLEAR POLICY COMPONENTS AND STAKEHOLDERS 
One of the major challenges in understanding Japan’s nuclear policy is the diverse set of 
stakeholders.  Each dimension of Japan’s nuclear policy—deterrence, disarmament, and civil 
nuclear power—has its own stakeholders.  They often work in stovepipes, which has led to 
nuclear policy’s current compartmentalization.  After a brief overview of Japan’s nuclear 
policy, we attempt to better understand of the stakeholders in each dimension of Japan’s 
nuclear policy and assess the level of interaction (or lack thereof) among them, particularly 
upon heightened nuclear concern regarding North Korea and President Obama’s 
announcement of his government’s renewed commitment to nuclear disarmament.   
JAPAN’S  NUCLEAR  POLICY:  AN  OVERVIEW  
Japan’s choice to become a non-nuclear weapon state has deep psychological underpinnings 
in Japan’s postwar identity as a “heiwa kokka (peace state)”1 as well as “the only country that 
has been a victim of an atomic bomb (yui-itsu no hibaku-koku).”2  As Nakasone Hirofumi, 
while Foreign Minister in 2009, succinctly put it: “As Japan suffered nuclear catastrophes in 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the country knows the horror of nuclear devastation from its own 
experience… I believe it is Japan's mission to convey to all people around the world the facts 
                                                   
1 Mike M. Mochizuki, “Japan Tests the Nuclear Taboo,” Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 14, No. 2 (July 
2007), p. 306.  
2 See, for instance, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Heisei 20 nen-do Nihon no Gun-shuku Fu-
kakusan Gaiko (Japan’s Disarmament and Nonproliferation Diplomacy 2008), p. 30, 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/gun_hakusho/2008/pdfs/hon1_3.pdf (accessed June 20 
2012).  
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of the calamity of nuclear bombings that happened in August 1945 in Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki, across the boundaries of various political viewpoints and ideologies.”3   
“Three Non-Nuclear Principles (Hikaku San-gensoku),” introduced by Prime Minister Sato 
Eisaku in 1967, has been the foundation of Japan’s postwar nuclear policy.  Under these 
principles, Japan has pledged that it will not “produce, possess, or allow the introduction of 
nuclear weapons onto Japanese soil.”4 These principles were then put into the larger context 
of “Four Pillars of Nuclear Policy (Kaku Yon Seisaku)” in 1968.  These “four pillars” 
included: (1) promotion of the peaceful use of nuclear energy; (2) efforts in global nuclear 
disarmament; (3) reliance on U.S. extended deterrence; and (4) steadfast maintenance of the 
Three Non-Nuclear Principles.5 
Based on these fundamental principles, Japan has developed its postwar nuclear policy with 
three dimensions: commitment to global nuclear disarmament (which has evolved to include 
its strong support for nuclear non- [and counter-] proliferation), reliance on U.S. extended 
nuclear deterrence (more commonly known as the “nuclear umbrella”), and a commitment 
to develop civil nuclear program.         
Commitment to global nuclear disarmament has been the most pronounced dimension of Japan’s 
nuclear policy.  Nuclear disarmament has been one of the most important priorities for 
Japan’s postwar diplomacy. Tokyo considers the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT)—
                                                   
3 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. ”Statement by Mr. Hirofumi Nakasone: “Conditions toward 
Zero-11 Benchmarks for Global Nuclear Disarmament” April 27, 2009.  
http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/un/disarmament/arms/state0904.html (accessed August 1, 2012).  
   Here and below, Japanese names are written with surnames first, except as necessary in citing 
English-language sources.  Non-standard transliterations are occasionally used when these are more 
familiar for the particular names in question. 
4 Prime Minister Sato’s statement in response to the question by Representative Narita Tomomi, 
Budget Committee, House of Representatives, 57th Ordinary Session, December 11, 1967, 
http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/SENTAKU/syugiin/057/0514/05712110514002a.html (accessed July1,, 
2012). In practice, Japan accepted what might be seen as an exception to the third principle. It 
permitted U.S. Navy ships to make port calls without asking the United States to state whether or 
not those ships carried nuclear weapons. 
5 Prime Minister Sato, in response to the question by Eda Saburo, 58th Ordinary Session, January 30, 
1968, http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/SENTAKU/syugiin/058/0001/main.html (accessed August 19, 
2012).  
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and the safeguard under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) as well as the 
Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT)—as critical international frameworks for nuclear 
disarmament.  Japan signed the NPT in 1970, ratifying it in 1976.   
Japan has also annually, since 1994, submitted a draft resolution on nuclear disarmament to 
the United Nations General Assembly. In 2008, Japan co-sponsored the International 
Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament (ICCND) with Australia, 
producing a report that identified an achievable path to the eventual elimination of nuclear 
arms.6  Following the conclusion of the 2010 NPT Conference, Japan, working with 
Australia, launched the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative (NDPI).  This ten-
nation group has met five times at the foreign minister-level since its establishment, as of the 
fall of 2012.  Finally, Japan has been active in working with other countries to start 
negotiations for the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT).7   
As the nature of the concerns related to nuclear weapons evolves due to the diversification 
of the countries which aspire to become nuclear-weapon states, and due to the increasing 
availability of relevant technology not only to such countries but also to non-state actors 
with malicious intentions, Japan’s support for the cause of nuclear disarmament is also 
evolving into efforts to more actively participate in multilateral discussions focused on 
nuclear nonproliferation and counter-proliferation.  For instance, when the G-8 summit 
launched the “G8 Global Partnership for the Proliferation of Weapons and Materials of 
Mass Destruction” (G8GP) in 2002 for a 10-year mandate, Japan initiated a number of 
assistance programs, including providing assistance to Russia for dismantling its nuclear 
weapons and submarines and hosting multinational capacity-building seminars in WMD 
                                                   
6 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Heisei 20 nen-do Nihon no Gun-shuku Fu-kakusan Gaiko (Japan’s 
Disarmament and Nonproliferation Diplomacy 2008), pp. 30-33, 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/gun_hakusho/2008/pdfs/hon1_3.pdf (accessed December  
10, 2012); Ogawa and Schiffer, “Japan’s Plutonium Reprocessing Dilemma,” p. 21; International 
Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament web page, http://www.icnnd.org 
(accessed November 5, 2012). 
7 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. Nihon no Gunshuku Fukakusan Gaikou Dai Roku-han (Heisei 25 
nen) (Japan’s Arms Control and Non-proliferation Diplomacy, 6th Edition (2013)) March 2013. pp. 
9-12.   
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nonproliferation such as Asian Export Control Seminars and Asian Non-Proliferation 
Seminars (ASTOP).  Japan was one of the first countries to sign the U.S.-initiated 
Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), which is a multilateral coalition aimed at counter-
proliferation of WMD and related technologies.   
Reliance on U.S. extended nuclear deterrence has been attracting greater attention in recent years.  
In the framework of the U.S.-Japan alliance, the United States is Japan’s ultimate security 
guarantor.  In particular, Article 5 of the Mutual Security Treaty between Japan and the 
United States obligates the United States to come to Japan’s defense when it faces external 
aggression.  This U.S. defense commitment of Japan has always been understood to include 
nuclear extended deterrence (more commonly referred to as the “nuclear umbrella”). Indeed, 
as noted earlier, the “Four Pillars of Non-Nuclear Policy” set forth by Prime Minister Sato 
explicitly include “reliance on U.S. extended deterrence” as a part of Japan’s non-nuclear 
policy.8       
Security assurance provided by the United States, particularly its “nuclear umbrella,” has 
played an important role in Japan’s maintaining its policy of renouncing nuclear weapons.  
Even if Japan’s own constitution denies it the right of belligerency and prohibits Japan from 
building defense capability beyond what is minimally necessary for self-defense, the Japanese 
government has never ruled out the option of building an independent nuclear weapons 
program. In 1957, Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi announced that while Japan would not 
seek nuclear weapons, a government review had concluded the possession of nuclear arms 
was not necessarily unconstitutional.9 Kishi’s successor Ikeda Hayato, preferring Japan to 
pursue economic growth over military buildup, explored the option of acquiring nuclear 
weapons as a means to reduce Japan’s defense budget.10  Even after Japan ratified the NPT 
in 1976, the Japanese government argued in 1978 that its constitution did not prohibit the 
                                                   
8 Policy address by Prime Minister Sato, 58th Ordinary Session, January 27, 1968, 
http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/SENTAKU/syugiin/058/0001/main.html (accessed May 1, 2013).  
9 Kurt M. Campbell and Tsuyoshi Sunohara, “Japan:  Thinking the Unthinkable,” pp. 218-253 in 
Campbell, Robert J. Einhorn, and Mitchell B. Reiss, eds.,  The Nuclear Tipping Point:  Why States 
Reconsider Their Choices (Brookings Institution Press, 2004), p. 221.  
10 Green and Furukawa, “Japan: New Nuclear Realism,” p. 349.  
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possession of nuclear weapons so long as those weapons did not exceed what was 
“minimally necessary” to defend Japan—a claim that Tokyo reiterated in 1982 and has 
upheld since then.11   
Up until the present, there have been two known occasions on which the Japanese 
government quietly but seriously explored the policy option of acquiring an independent 
nuclear capability.  Its first such deliberation took place under the watch of Prime Minister 
Sato from the late 1960s through the 1970s.12  The second known study of Japan’s nuclear 
option was initiated by the Japan Defense Agency (JDA; now the Ministry of Defense) from 
1994 to 1995, as Japan came out of the first North Korean nuclear crisis to face China’s 
nuclear test in 1995, eying the potential expiration of the NPT.  However, in both of these 
occasions, its alliance with the United States (and the existence of U.S. extended nuclear 
deterrence) was a key factor that led Japan to conclude that it would not be in Japan’s 
interest to seek an indigenous nuclear weapons program.   
Given concerns over North Korea’s nuclear program and China’s augmentation of its 
nuclear forces, the reliability of U.S. extended nuclear deterrence has been more actively 
debated in Japan.  The debate particularly intensified among Japanese political leaders, 
defense officials, and other intellectuals after President Obama announced during his visit to 
Prague in April 2009, “I state clearly and with conviction America's commitment to seek the 
                                                   
11 Statement by Sanada Hideo, Director of Cabinet Legislative Bureau, at the Budget Committee of 
the House of Councillors, March 11, 1978; Statement by Tsunoda Reijiro, Director of Cabinet 
Legislative Bureau, at the Budget Committee of the House of Councillors, April 5, 1982. Extracted 
from Heisei 19-nendo Ban Bouei Handbook (Handbook for Defense 2007) (Tokyo: Asagumo Shimbun-
sha, 2007), pp. 603-605.  
12 The two Study Group reports were never released in their entirety to the public. Summaries of 
both, however, were reported by Asahi Shimbun on November 13, 1994. For quotes from the 
summary of the two Study Group Reports reported in Asahi Shimbun, see 
http://homepage.mac.com/ehara_gen/jealous_gay/nuclear_armament.html (accessed December 8, 
2008). For a later analysis that contains additional information, see Yuri Kase, “The Costs and 
Benefits of Japan’s Nuclearization: An Insight into the 1968/70 Internal Report,” Nonproliferation 
Review 8, No. 2 (summer 2001).  
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peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons,”13 followed by the U.S.-Russia 
agreement over a new START in March 2010.     
 Japan’s commitment to develop a civil nuclear program, while the least pronounced, has the longest 
history, long predating Japan’s adoption of the Three Non-Nuclear Principles and its 
ratification of the NPT.  Japan is the world’s third-largest user of nuclear energy, ranking 
only behind the United States and France.14  It has a robust civil nuclear energy program in 
which, prior to the March 11th accident at Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Station, 55 
light-water power reactors were operated by ten electric power companies, with additional 
plants either under construction or in regulatory review.15  
Japan resumed its efforts to develop a civilian nuclear power industry after the conclusion of 
the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty.  In 1955, the United States and Japan concluded the 
Agreement for Cooperation between the Government of Japan and the Government of the 
United States of America Concerning Civil Uses of Atomic Energy.  This bilateral 
agreement, renegotiated and revised many times (most recently in 1988), allowed U.S. 
technology assistance that included the provision of enriched uranium, research reactors,16 
and staff training at U.S. national laboratories.17   
Demonstrating its commitment to the peaceful use of nuclear energy (which was necessary 
in order to receive U.S. technological assistance), Japan signed a series of international 
treaties and agreements. In November 1955, Japan signed a bilateral agreement with the U.S. 
                                                   
13 The White House. Remarks by President Barack Obama. Prague, Czech Republic. April 5, 2009.  
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-barack-obama-prague-delivered 
(accessed July 22, 2013). 
14 U.S. Energy Information Administration, “World Net Nuclear Electric Power Generation, 1980-
2007,” http://www.eia.doe.gov/fuelnuclear.html (accessed May 5, 2013). 
15 Emma Chanlett-Avery and Mary Beth Nikitin, Japan’s Nuclear Future: Policy Debate, Prospects, and 
U.S. Interests, CRS Report for Congress, RL 34487 (February 19, 2009), p. 3. 
16 The reactors provided by the United States under the agreement included a water boiler reactor 
that became the first reactor to go on-line in Japan. 
17 Jane Nakano, “Civilian Nuclear Cooperation Between the United States and Japan” in Yuki 
Tatsumi ed., New Nuclear Agenda: Prospects for U.S.-Japan Cooperation, (Stimson Center, 2012), p.44. 
http://www.stimson.org/images/uploads/research-
pdfs/New_Nuclear_Agenda_FINAL_3_15_12.pdf  Nakano’s chapter (pp 41-61) provides an 
excellent summary of U.S.-Japan cooperation in the civil nuclear power industry.   
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that allowed the latter to loan highly enriched uranium to Japan for nuclear reactor research. 
The agreement imposed the conditions that (1) the spent fuel would be returned to the U.S., 
and (2) Japan would provide an after-use report on the loaned uranium.18 Japan and the U.S. 
took this initial arrangement a step further when the two countries signed the Agreement for 
Cooperation between Japan and the United States Concerning the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear 
Energy in February 1968.19  Japan also became one of the first nations to join the IAEA 
upon that body’s establishment in 1957, subjecting itself to IAEA inspections. Furthermore, 
it became the first country with significant nuclear activities to implement the Additional 
Protocol (adopted by the IAEA in May 1997) in 1999, permitting expanded inspection 
activities by the IAEA.   
Domestically, Japan institutionalized its commitment to the peaceful use of nuclear energy 
through a series of legislative acts dating to the 1950s. The 1955 Atomic Energy Basic Law 
(Genshi-ryoku Kihon-ho) obligates the Japanese government to limit all research, development, 
and use of nuclear energy only to “peaceful purposes”20 and provides the principles on 
which additional laws have been enacted to regulate Japan’s civil nuclear power activities. 
STAKEHOLDERS  IN  JAPAN’S  NUCLEAR  POLICY  
Japan’s nuclear policy has three dimensions—commitment to nuclear disarmament, reliance 
on U.S. extended nuclear deterrence, and maintenance of a robust civil nuclear energy 
program.  As briefly mentioned in the previous section, these three dimensions are often 
discussed independently of one another in Japan.  To present, there has been very little 
effort demonstrated by the Japanese government to better integrate these three dimensions 
                                                   
18 Since then, the agreement has been revised and replaced by subsequent U.S.-Japan Agreements for 
Cooperation Concerning Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy. See Heisei 2-nen ban Genshiryoku Hakusho 
(Atomic Energy White Paper 1990) 
http://www.aec.go.jp/jicst/NC/about/hakusho/wp1990/sb2090102.htm  (accessed March 1, 
2013).  
19 The agreement was replaced by a new Agreement for Cooperation between Japan and the United 
States Concerning the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy in 1988.  
20 Genshi-ryoku Kihon-ho (Atomic Energy Basic Law), Article Two, http://law.e-
gov.go.jp/htmldata/S30/S30HO186.html (accessed February 3, 2013).  
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and force a coordinated and comprehensive nuclear policy.   
Such a lack of policy coordination has led to one dimension of Japan’s nuclear policy 
working against its other dimensions.  For instance, Japan’s civil nuclear energy program has 
often complicated Japan’s efforts in nuclear disarmament.  In particular, Japan’s pursuit of a 
closed nuclear fuel cycle in its civil nuclear energy program has been considered highly 
controversial.  A closed, complete fuel cycle can create a ready supply of materials that can 
be used to construct a nuclear weapon, putting Japan’s nonproliferation commitments in 
question.21    
One of the most important contributing factors to the current lack of comprehensive 
nuclear policy in Tokyo is a lack of coordination among the stakeholders in all dimensions of 
the policy.  Up until the present, the stakeholders in each of the three dimensions of Japan’s 
nuclear policy have pursued their own policy goals mostly independently of one another. 
This section catalogs the stakeholders in each area of Japan’s nuclear policy. 
Nuclear disarmament, nonproliferation, and counter-proliferation 
Nuclear disarmament, nonproliferation, and counter-proliferation are international norms 
whose implementation has been supported by multi-layered multilateral initiatives.  The 
NPT, coupled with safeguards by the IAEA, provides the most comprehensive normative 
framework.  They are expected to be supplemented by multilateral arms control treaties such 
as the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty 
(FMCT)22 and multinational export control mechanisms (such as the Nuclear Suppliers’ 
Group [NSG], Wassenaar Arrangements, and Missile Technology Control Regime [MTCR]), 
and other international coalitions (such as the Proliferation Security Initiative [PSI] and 
United Nations Security Council [UNSC] Resolution 1540).   
                                                   
21Michael J. Green and Katsuhisa Furukawa, “New Ambitions, Old Obstacles: Japan and its Search 
for Arms Control Strategy,” Arms Control Today (July 2000). Accessed at http://www.cfr.org/arms-
control-disarmament-and-nonproliferation/new-ambitions-old-obstacles-japan-its-search-arms-
control-strategy/p3701 (Accessed April 3, 2013) 
22 Japan has strongly supported an early ratification of CTBT and pushed to start negotiation for 
FMCT. 
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In this policy area, there are two major stakeholders within the Japanese government.  One is 
Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA).  In particular, the Disarmament, Non-
proliferation and Science Department—led by its director, who carries the rank of 
ambassador—has played a central role in MOFA’s efforts in this area.  Working through 
Japan’s Permanent Missions to the United Nations (New York), to the International 
Organizations in Vienna (where IAEA Headquarters are located) and to the Conference of 
Disarmament (CD) (Geneva), the three divisions under this Department— the Arms 
Control Division; Non-proliferation, Science and Nuclear Energy Division; and 
International Nuclear Energy Cooperation Division—have forged Japan’s diplomatic efforts 
to advocate nuclear disarmament and non- (and counter-) proliferation.23  
The second major stakeholder in this area within the Japanese government is the Ministry of 
Economy, Trade and Industry (METI).  In Japan, export control is regulated through the 
Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Law.  As all exports from Japan require METI’s 
licensing, METI plays a central role not only in enforcing export control in Japan, but also in 
reaching out to other countries to build their capacity in this area.  Within METI, the Trade 
and Economic Cooperation Bureau, led by its director-general, is in charge of export 
control.  The Bureau’s Security Export Control Division is in charge of managing overall 
regulation, engaging in discussion with other countries on export control policy-related 
issues, and organizing capacity-building activities for other countries.  The Security Export 
Inspection Division engages in outreach efforts within Japan, as well as examining the 
exporters.  The Security Export Licensing Division focuses on examining and approving or 
rejecting export licenses.24 
                                                   
23 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. About the Ministry. 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/about/hq/org.html. Ambassador Amano Yukiya, the incumbent IAEA 
Secretary-General, served as the Director of this department between 2002 – 2005, and as 
Ambassador of the Permanent Mission in Vienna between 2005 – 2009 (until he was elected as 
IAEA Director-General).  International Atomic Energy Agency. “IAEA Director General Yukiya 
Amano: Biography”  http://www.iaea.org/About/dg/amano/biography.html.  (Accessed May 13, 
2013) 
24 Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry. “Export Control” 
http://www.meti.go.jp/policy/anpo/englishpage.html  (Accessed June 30, 2013).   
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In addition, anti-nuclear non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in Japan have added 
important voices against nuclear weapons and nuclear power plants within Japan during the 
Cold War.  Both of the two major anti-nuclear NGOs in Japan—Gen-sui-baku Kinshi Nihon 
Kyougikai (Gensui-kyo, or Japan Council Against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs) and Gen-sui-
baku Kinshi Nihon Kokumin Kaigi (Gensui-kin, or Japan National Conference Against Atomic 
and Hydrogen Bombs) — have been organized primarily by supporters of the Japan 
Communist Party (JCP) and Social Democratic Party of Japan (SDPJ).  Activities by these 
NGOs have been losing traction since the end of the Cold War, particularly after the 
emergence of the nuclear problem in North Korea.  The political decline of the primary 
supporters of these two NGOs—the JCP and SDPJ—has also contributed to the NGOs’ 
declining presence.   Following the accident at Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Station in 
March 2011, however, a civic movement against Japan’s continued reliance on nuclear power 
has revived anti-nuclear weapon NGOs such as Gensui-kin and Gensui-kyo.  The potential 
implications of their revival will be discussed below.         
Reliance on U.S. extended nuclear deterrence 
The sustainability of Japan’s reliance on U.S. extended nuclear deterrence very much 
depends on whether Japan can maintain confidence in the U.S. commitment to defend Japan 
under the U.S.-Japan alliance.  As such, this area is influenced by the success of efforts to 
manage the U.S.-Japan alliance in a manner that enables Japan to continue to have such 
confidence in the United States.     
The predominance of the U.S.-Japan alliance management historically made MOFA the 
primary stakeholder.  From the perspective of managing broader U.S.-Japan relations, the 
entire North American Affairs Bureau—the First and Second North America Divisions, 
Japan-U.S. Security Treaty Division, and Japan-U.S. Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) 
Office—was the primary stakeholder in this area.  In particular, its Japan-U.S. Security 
Treaty Division and Japan-U.S. SOFA Office have played critical roles in managing the U.S.-
Japan alliance.   
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In recent years, however, the Ministry of Defense (MOD, formerly the Japan Defense 
Agency [JDA])—has emerged as another important stakeholder.  As the Department of 
Defense (DOD) began to play a greater role in alliance consultation on the U.S. side, the 
MOD, as DOD’s institutional partner, increased its presence in alliance consultation.  Within 
the MOD, the Defense Policy Section, Japan-U.S. Cooperation Section, and Strategic 
Planning Office—all housed within the Defense Policy Bureau—and the Defense Planning 
Department of Joint Staff Office specifically engage with the United States in consultation 
on extended deterrence.  As the scope of the discussion between the officials of the two 
countries in the framework of alliance consultation becomes wider in its scope in coming 
years, the significance of the MOD, as Japan’s primary national defense agency, will likely 
continue to increase.       
Maintenance of a robust civil nuclear power industry 
While the stakeholders in the areas of nuclear disarmament (including non- and counter-
proliferation) and extended nuclear deterrence are primarily interested in Japan’s external 
policy goals (with the exception of METI), the stakeholders in civil nuclear power industry 
have a primarily domestic focus.  Also, because the utilization of nuclear power as an 
alternative source of energy is one of Japan’s important domestic policy priorities, the 
number of stakeholders within the Japanese government is bigger.       
For instance, in the area of research alone, the Ministry of Culture, Education, Sports, 
Science and Technology (MEXT) is the primary stakeholder regarding basic-to-intermediary 
research, while METI leads commercial/advanced research.  Cooperation with the United 
States on civil nuclear power is led by the Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA), a 
government agency established in 2005 with the merger of the Japan Nuclear Cycle Institute 
(JNC) and Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute (JAERI).   
In the area of industry regulation, there has not been an independent national regulatory 
body in Japan.  Prior to the March 2011 accident at Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power 
station, the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA), housed within METI, and the 
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Nuclear Safety Commission, housed within the Cabinet Office, regulated various aspects of 
the nuclear power industry.  Following strong criticism of the Japanese government’s 
inability to quickly respond to the Fukushima disaster and lack of rigor in enforcing safety 
standards for nuclear power plants, NISA and NSC were merged and attached to the 
Ministry of Environment.  Additionally, since the Fukushima nuclear emergency, several 
cabinet-level positions were created: the Minister for the Restoration from and Prevention of 
Nuclear Accidents, and the Minister of State for the Corporation in Support of 
Compensation for Nuclear Damage.25  
Finally, the power industry—electric power companies, in the case of Japan—is an 
important stakeholder in this area.  Nine of the ten utilities in Japan own, operate, and 
distribute nuclear power. Nuclear power plant projects have not been particularly sensitive to 
market conditions.  In addition, the Japanese government provides monetary incentives to 
municipalities that house nuclear power plants.  Such subsidies aim at offsetting any 
potential business risks commonly associated with being located in proximity to nuclear 
power plants.26   
EVOLUTION  IN  RELATIONS  AMONG  THE  STAKEHOLDERS  
During the Cold War, there was very little connectivity among the policy goals of the three 
dimensions of Japan’s nuclear policy. The international environment during those years 
allowed Japan to maintain its compartmentalized nuclear policy.  With possession of nuclear 
weapons and their technologies limited to the five “declared nuclear states (the United 
States, Soviet Union, England, France, and China),” it was relatively easy to make a 
distinction between nuclear weapon “haves” and “have nots.”  The number of countries that 
could afford civilian nuclear power as an alternative source of energy was also limited.  The 
existing global nonproliferation regime—commonly referred to as the “Nuclear 
Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) system”—was established on the premise that nuclear-
                                                   
25 The Office of Prime Minister, List of Ministers. 
http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/noda/meibo/daijin/index_e.html (Accessed May 1, 2013) 
26 Nakano, “Civilian Nuclear Cooperation Between the United States and Japan,” pp. 44-45. 
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related technologies and materials are controlled by a small number of countries, with 
declared nuclear states working to ultimately abandon their nuclear capabilities.  Given such 
an external environment, Japan did not have to aggressively try to integrate its nuclear 
policy—it could strongly advocate a global nuclear disarmament goal even while 
contradictorily relying on the U.S. nuclear “umbrella” for its safety and investing in 
developing a sophisticated, indigenous civil nuclear power industry.   
With the collapse of the Soviet Union, this landscape began to change drastically.  The world 
first grappled with the challenge of preventing those involved in the nuclear weapons 
program in the former Soviet countries from “selling” their expertise to states and other 
entities that might abuse them.  It also became extremely difficult to convince those with 
nuclear ambitions from pursuing their own nuclear programs.  The first North Korea 
nuclear crisis and subsequent nuclear tests by India and Pakistan in 1998 were one of the 
early indicators that a world without the Soviet Union would not necessarily be a safer place 
as far as the nuclear question was concerned.  If anything, these events seemed to suggest 
that it would be more difficult to stop those with nuclear aspirations absent the equilibrium 
in strategic forces between two superpowers.       
Further, progress in science and technology—rapid developments in the internet in 
particular—has made the transfer and sharing of information around the globe much easier, 
making the world “flat.”27  While this has brought positive attributes of globalization, such as 
better accessibility to goods and knowledge, it has also intensified the downside of 
globalization, the heightened risk of nation-states as well as hostile individuals obtaining 
information and materials that could pose a threat, such as those related to weapons of mass 
destruction (WMD), including nuclear weapons.  Furthermore, the growing recognition of 
nuclear power as an alternative source of energy, combined with the lowering of costs, has 
led a greater number of countries to pursue civilian nuclear power plants.   
Given all these developments, the response to the nuclear challenge in the post-Cold War 
world has become more multi-faceted and complex than that during the Cold War.  It 
                                                   
27 Thomas Friedman, The World Is Flat (Farrar Straus & Giroux, 2005). 
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requires the stakeholders in a country’s nuclear issues in today’s world to better coordinate in 
shaping the country’s nuclear policy.  In short, an “all-of-government” approach is essential 
for a country to have an effective nuclear policy.     
Japan has also been impacted by such evolution.  First, North Korea’s nuclear crisis brought 
into sharper relief one of the contradictions in Japan’s nuclear policy.  How can Tokyo 
advocate global nuclear disarmament when it is completely dependent on U.S. extended 
nuclear deterrence for its security?   
Specifically, the existence of a clear, direct nuclear weapons threat against Japan revived the 
debate within Japan over acquisition of an independent (if limited) nuclear capability.  In the 
mid-1990s, the then-JDA conducted an internal study that assessed the pros and cons of 
Japan’s acquiring a nuclear capability.  The study concluded that, given the expected damage 
not only to the U.S.-Japan alliance, but also to Japan’s relationship with South Korea and 
China, as well as to Japan’s international reputation as a non-nuclear state, it was not in 
Japan’s national interests to pursue such an option.  As the North Korea crisis drags well 
into the 2000s with no sign of real breakthrough toward North Korea’s denuclearization, 
this issue is debated in Japan more openly than ever before.       
There are three major differences between the public nuclear debate within Japan in the 
2000s and that of the Cold War era and the 1990s. First and foremost, there is a significantly 
higher degree of political tolerance among those who entertain the idea of Japan going 
nuclear.  Previously, a politician’s reference to Japan’s potential nuclear capability or 
questioning Japan’s non-nuclear policy meant an immediate dismissal from his position in 
the government or in a political party.  This is no longer the case. For instance, in April 
2002, then-leader of the Democratic Party of Japan Ozawa Ichiro stated in a speech, “With 
the plutonium reserve from nuclear power plants, Japan has enough to produce thousands 
of warheads.”28  Former Chief Cabinet Secretary (and later Prime Minister) Fukuda Yasuo 
also maintained that position when he mentioned the possibility of Japan’s pursuing a 
                                                   
28 Kyodo News, April 6, 2002.  
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nuclear option in case the international security environment deteriorated.29  Aso Taro, while 
serving as foreign minister for the Abe government in 2006 (prior to becoming Prime 
Minister himself), argued that it would be important for Japan to discuss all options, 
including the possession of nuclear weapons.  He further rejected the notion that a nuclear 
debate is somehow taboo, arguing that “Japan is a free country that does not control 
people’s opinions.” Despite severe criticism in the mass media suggesting these comments 
were “inappropriate,” none of these figures were fired or forced to resign from the positions 
they held at the time.30  
Second, the tone of debate has grown more reasonable.  Although the debate over Japan’s 
nuclear option is still spearheaded primarily by those who can be categorized as “right-
wing”31 (which sometimes implies a greater degree of political extremity than the same term 
does in the United States), their arguments have grown more pragmatic. For instance, many 
of them, unlike during the Cold War, do not support Japan abandoning its alliance with the 
U.S. and remilitarizing in order to develop a full range of offensive capabilities, including 
nuclear weapons. Rather, they propose a range of options for Japan far from this extreme. 
For instance, Ushio Masato, a conservative journalist who specializes in military affairs, 
suggests that Japan, while maintaining a strong alliance with the U.S., gradually abandon the 
Three Non-Nuclear Principles.  He proposes that Japan revise the principle of not allowing 
the introduction of nuclear weapons on Japanese land, thereby permitting the U.S. to deploy 
                                                   
29 Yomiuri Shimbun, June 1 and June 3, 2002 
30 Asahi Shimbun, October 20, 2006; Nakagawa Shoichi, “Jiritsu shita Kokka no Kaku-busou Rongi 
(Nuclear Debate of an Independent Nation),” Voice (December 2006), pp. 46-51. 
31 Sometimes referred to as “neo-autonomists” or “nationalists,” these figures argue that Japan needs 
a more independent security policy, implicitly suggesting that Japan keep an open mind about 
acquiring nuclear weapons. See, for example, Rust M. Deming, “Japan’s Constitution and Defense 
Policy: Entering a New Era?,” Strategic Forum No. 213 (Institute for National Strategic Studies, 
National Defense University, November 2004), 
http://www.ndu.edu/inss/strforum/SF213/SF213_Final.pdf (accessed December 8, 2008); and 
Richard J. Samuels, “Securing Japan: The Current Discourse,” Journal of Japanese Studies, Volume 33, 
Number 1 (winter 2007), 
http://web.mit.edu/polisci/research/samuels/Samuels%20JJS%20article.pdf (accessed December 
8, 2012).  
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its nuclear weapons in Japan.32  Itou Kan, another conservative political analyst, advocates 
Japan’s acquiring a nuclear deterrence capability that is minimally required for Japan to 
defend itself but rejects the idea of Japan becoming a major military power.33 
Third, moderates have entered the debate.  For instance, Toshiyuki Shikata, a respected 
retired Japan Ground Self-Defense Force officer who is known for his strong support for 
the U.S.-Japan alliance, advocates a robust discussion in Japan over nuclear weapons.  While 
opposing the idea of Japan pursuing an independent nuclear capability, Shikata believes such 
a debate will allow Japan to actively engage in its alliance relationship with the U.S. and 
thereby ensure the credibility of the U.S. nuclear umbrella.34  Morimoto Satoshi, who served 
as defense minister in 2011-2012, maintains that Japan needs to have a more thorough 
debate over its nuclear option, both inside and outside the government, although he argues 
that the acquisition of nuclear capability would not serve Japan’s interests.35  
The greater focus on whether Japan has sufficient deterrent capability is a reflection of the 
Japanese public’s disappointment in global nuclear disarmament efforts.  Polls taken 
following North Korea’s nuclear tests in 2006 suggested that the Japanese public (1) 
regarded the discussion on nuclear weapons as less of a taboo, and (2) had lower confidence 
in the international nuclear nonproliferation regime.  For instance, the opinion poll taken by 
the Yomiuri Shimbun in November 2006 showed that 45% of respondents agreed that Japan 
should have a more open discussion on nuclear weapons.36  Similarly, in the opinion poll 
conducted by the Mainichi Shimbun in November 2006, while only 14% advocated Japan’s 
                                                   
32 Ushio Masato, “San Gensoku wa Dankai-teki Haiki-wo (Three Principles to be Relinquished 
Gradually),” Will (January 2007), pp. 77-79.  
33 Itou Kan, “Jikoku no Bouei ni Sekinin wo Moteru Atarimae no Kuni-ni (Toward a Normal Country that 
Can Be Responsible For Its Own Security),” in Nihon Kakubusou no Ron-ten (Points of Debate in 
Japan’s Nuclear Option) (Tokyo: PHP Kenkyu-sho, 2006), pp. 189-251.  
34 See, for instance, Shikata Toshiyuki, “Gunjiteki Tsu-ru kara Seijiteki Tsu-ru he (From a Military to a 
Political Tool),” Will (January 2007), pp. 38-45.  
35 Morimoto Satoshi, Nihon Bouei Saiko-ron (Japan’s Defense Revisited) (Tokyo: Kairyu-sha, 2008), 
pp. 266-278.  
36 Yomiuri Shimbun, November Opinion Polls, conducted November 11-12, 2006, 
http://www.mansfieldfdn.org/polls/2006/poll-06-18.htm (accessed July 2, 2012). 
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acquiring nuclear capability, 61% considered it all right to discuss nuclear options.37 
Furthermore, in January 2008 opinion polls conducted by the MOFA on Japan’s 
disarmament and nonproliferation policy, fewer than half (47.5%) of the respondents 
thought the NPT was helpful in international peace and stability. Among those who did not 
think the NPT was helpful, almost 73% identified the lingering nuclear weapon problems 
with North Korea and Iran as the reason for their answer.38  While Japan’s advocacy for a 
nuclear-free world continues to derive vast support from the general public, a growing sense 
of nuclear insecurity, driven primarily by North Korea, is forcing Japan to recognize that 
while nuclear disarmament is a worthy norm, it also needs to pay greater attention to 
sustaining the viability of U.S. extended nuclear deterrence in the more immediate future.  In 
other words, better policy coordination is required among stakeholders in nuclear 
disarmament (plus non- and counter-proliferation) and stakeholders for extended deterrence 
within Japan’s broader national security policy.  
Among the stakeholders for maintaining confidence in U.S. extended nuclear deterrence, 
there has been a more explicit recognition that a long-term goal of a nuclear-free world can 
be compatible with the goal of maintaining the effectiveness of U.S. extended nuclear 
deterrence.  For instance, the 2010 National Defense Program Guideline (NDPG), Japan’s 
mid-term defense policy planning document, proposed that Japan would play a “constructive 
and active role in international nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation efforts, so as to 
achieve the long-term goal of creating a world without nuclear weapons” while 
acknowledging that “as long as nuclear weapons exist, the extended deterrence provided by 
the United States, with nuclear deterrent as a vital element, will be indispensable.”39  This is 
the first time that the NDPG argued the necessity of U.S. nuclear extended deterrence in the 
context of a more immediate tool necessary to defend Japan while it continues to pursue a 
                                                   
37 “Kaku Hoyuu ‘No”, Giron wa Younin (“No” to the Possession of Nuclear Weapons, but OK to 
Discuss),” Mainichi Shimbun, November 27, 2006.  
38 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Nihon no Gunshuku Fukakusan Gaikou ni kansuru Ishiki Chosa 
(Opinion Polls on Japan’s Disarmament and Nonproliferation Diplomacy), conducted January 11-
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39 National Defense Program Guidelines for FY 2011 and Beyond. December 17, 2010. 
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long-term goal of nuclear disarmament.   
While there has been some nascent effort in Japan to resolve its dilemma of being an 
advocate for global nuclear disarmament while continuing to rely on U.S. extended nuclear 
deterrence, the accident at Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant in March 2011 created a 
gap between the two external policy goals mentioned above and the future of Japan’s civil 
nuclear power industry.  Following the accident, the Japanese public’s aversion to nuclear 
power has been growing  stronger, prompting Kan Naoto’s pledge of “zero nuclear power 
plants” when serving as prime minister between 2010 – 2011.  Indeed, under the watch of 
his government, all existing nuclear power plants in Japan ceased operation, which the 
government claimed necessary to conduct safety stress tests.  Although the succeeding 
government led by Noda Yoshihiko reversed Kan’s decision and began to pave the way to 
resume the operation of some nuclear power plants, Kan’s “zero nuclear power-plant” 
pledge galvanized mass anti-nuclear protest (in which not only Kan but also his predecessor 
Hatoyama Yukio participated).   
Whether the resurfacing of “anti-nuclear power plant” sentiments among the Japanese 
public has empowered “anti-nuclear” NGOs to spread their influence enough to have 
spillover effects in other dimensions of Japan’s nuclear policy needs to be carefully 
monitored.  The developments among anti-nuclear NGOs are especially critical.  As 
examined earlier, the established anti-nuclear NGOs are organized by Japan’s Communist 
and Socialist parties, thus often making them anti-U.S. and anti-U.S.-Japan alliance.  For 
instance, the website of Gensui-kin (an anti-nuclear NGO organized primarily by the Social 
Democratic Party of Japan, the former Socialist Party) also includes disapproving 
commentary on the U.S. military presence in Okinawa, the U.S.-Japan alliance, and the Japan 
Self-Defense Forces.  This suggests that if empowered enough by the public sense of anxiety 
vis-à-vis the safety of nuclear power plants and their risks, the activities of “anti-nuclear” 
NGOs may begin to garner support for their anti-U.S. and anti-U.S.-Japan alliance activities 
as well.  
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POLITICAL INFLUENCE ON NUCLEAR AND SECURITY POLICY 
Thus far, this report has examined Japan’s multiple nuclear policies and their stakeholders, as 
well as how the interaction among these stakeholders has evolved.  But another set of issues 
looms large as a potential major factor that can influence nuclear policy’s future:  the 
evolving role played by Japanese political leaders in Japan’s policy-making processes.   
The role that Japan’s political leaders play in the policy-making process in Tokyo has 
undergone significant changes during Japan’s postwar political history. Under what is known 
as “the 1955 System,” in which the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) enjoyed dominant, long-
term rule, Japan effectively had a “dual governance” system—governance by the LDP-led 
cabinet, or government, supported and sometimes even led by a strong bureaucracy, with 
oversight by but also much deference from the broader LDP majority in the Diet. During 
the LDP’s more than fifty years of nearly uninterrupted predominance, most of its prime 
ministers struggled to assert their leadership roles in running the country.   
While there had been sporadic efforts to enhance the Prime Minister’s role in policy-making 
process – and, by extension, to enhance the role of politicians more generally –  it was the 
comprehensive administrative reform initiated by Prime Minister Hashimoto Ryutaro’s 
government that created the structure for the prime minister to exercise his leadership in 
policy- and decision-making if he so chooses.40  And it was his successor Koizumi 
Jun’ichirouwho, during his five-year tenure, proved how much the prime minister can 
exercise leadership if he effectively leverages the decision-making process to his advantage.  
However, following Koizumi’s departure in 2006, none of his short-lived LDP successor 
administrations – those led by current prime minister Abe and then Fukuda Yasuo and Aso 
Tarou– were able to assert their role in the policy-making process as deftly as Koizumi had.  
Following these three prime ministers’ short tenures, the LDP lost power to the DPJ in the 
general election of August 2009. The DPJ received voter support by criticizing LDP’s 
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methods of governance. In particular, the DPJ’s first Prime Minister, Hatoyama Yukio, 
claimed that the LDP had allowed the bureaucracy to run the government and that his own 
DPJ would inject seiji shudo (leadership by politicians) to allow elected legislators to assume a 
greater role in the policy-making process. The DPJ also criticized the LDP’s “dual 
governance” system, and insisted that it would end such a practice in order to ensure unity 
between the DPJ and the government. In addition, DPJ politicians insisted that they were 
knowledgeable enough on policy matters not to need support from the bureaucracy.  
However, with the failure of Prime Minister Kan and his government to effectively respond 
to the Great Eastern Japan Earthquake and the accident at the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear 
power station, the DPJ demonstrated that overreach by politicians in policy-and decision-
making process could prove extremely counterproductive, incapacitating the government.41   
In December 2012, as a result of these DPJ policy failures, the LDP returned triumphantly 
to government, ending the DPJ’s three-year rule.  Prime Minister Abe, winning a second 
chance to serve as the prime minister, appears to be trying to establish a leadership style 
similar to Koizumi.  For instance, in the area of foreign and security policy-making, he has 
moved to establish a Japanese national security council to assist the prime minister 
independent of the bureaucracy.  He has also made clear his intention to put his 
comparatively distinctive hawkish and nationalist stamp on foreign and security policy.   
If Abe’s renewed effort to institutionalize the enhancement of the Prime Minister’s role in 
policy-making process succeeds, it might lead Japan to depart from the status quo in which 
policy matters are discussed and decided in a stovepiped manner.  In the case of nuclear 
policy, this may allow Japan to integrate the three dimensions of its policy and offer a more 
comprehensive nuclear policy.  As the 2010 NDPG outlines, there is a greater recognition 
among stakeholders that maintaining the credibility of U.S. extended nuclear deterrence to 
maintain Japan’s security is an extended but interim measure consistent with advocating 
                                                   
41 On the problem caused by Prime Minister Kan’s insistence that he be in charge of all the aspect of 
the response to Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power station accident, see Japan Restoration Initiative, 
Fukushima Genpatsu Jiko Dokuritu Chousa Iinkai: Chousa Kenshou Houkoku-sho (Fukushima nuclear 
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nuclear disarmament and preventing nuclear proliferation.  Institutionalization of a policy-
making process that allows the prime minister to break down traditional stovepiping among 
government agencies might facilitate better policy coordination among the stakeholders for 
nuclear disarmament and extended deterrence.  At the same time, overly heavy-handed or 
poorly managed attempts to exert political influence and shift Japanese nuclear policy from 
its long-gestating, sensitively handled, and carefully balanced status quo risks destabilization, 
popular pushback, and ultimately the opposite of the intended result. 
Meanwhile, new citizen activism has emerged as another potential political influence on 
Japanese nuclear policy, one that stands to make difficult the integration of the civil nuclear 
power industry into the remaining two dimensions of Japan’s nuclear policy.  While there is a 
clear recognition of the nuclear security challenges Japan faces from North Korea, anti-
nuclear power sentiment following the 2011 Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power station 
remains strong, particularly among the Japanese public.  In fact, the post-Fukushima surge of 
wariness toward Japan’s continuing to operate nuclear power plants has created a new 
dilemma within Japan’s civil nuclear power policy.  Today, the government needs to be 
responsive to the public’s concern about the risks of having nuclear power plants within 
Japan and work toward lowering, if not eliminating, the role of nuclear power in Japan’s 
energy policy.  At the same time, the Japanese government is determined to compete in the 
export of nuclear power plants to developing countries that also seek to lessen their 
dependence on oil.  How Japan can forge a civil nuclear power policy that maintains its 
technological advantage and sophistication and promote it as an industry with global 
competitiveness while lowering its own dependence on nuclear power at home – let alone 
how such a policy can be integrated into Japan’s comprehensive nuclear policy – is a newly 
emerging policy dilemma for which Japan has yet to find an answer.   
Other sources of potential political influence have emerged as well.   Some observers point 
to a rising tide of nationalism in Japan, spurred in part by maritime territorial disputes with 
both China and South Korea.  Related, the populist and nationalist Japan Restoration Party 
emerged as a genuine third party in the 2012 Lower House election that brought the LDP 
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back to power. It gained nearly as many seats as the flagging DPJ, and it (along with other 
smaller and new conservative parties) has since attempted to cooperate with and exert 
influence on the ruling LDP, especially in matters related to security policy.  Finally, as noted 
above, general public opinion seems to have become more open to the notion of 
independent Japanese nuclear capabilities, something that might support but also actively 
bring about moves by Japanese policymakers away from their current stance. 
To what degree, then, should we expect such politicization – that is, party-political leverage 
but also public opinion leverage as channeled through parties – to influence Japanese nuclear 
and broader security policy?    We first briefly examine the 2009-2012 DPJ government, 
which consciously aimed to avoid over-dependence on bureaucratic policymakers, and which 
had served as the main driver of revitalized party competition in Japan, as an illustrative case 
of potential but largely stymied political influence. 
THE  CASE  OF  THE  DPJ42  
By the time the DPJ took control of Japan’s government in 2009, ousting the long-ruling 
LDP, the Japanese policymaking environment had already begun to amplify the (potential) 
influence of public and political opinion relative to bureaucratic expertise.  Through repeated 
institutional reforms and reorganization, Cabinet power, particularly the power of Prime 
Minister, had been strengthened.  The greater “presidentialization” of political leadership 
and a greater emphasis on two-party competition had meanwhile triggered politicization of a 
wide range of policy issues, including those, such as security policy, that had previously been 
considered more “non-political.”  The DPJ explicitly aimed to take advantage of this 
evolution and inject political influence into the security policymaking process as a matter of 
democratic principle. 
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Yuki Tatsumi, “How Does the Democratic Party of Japan Affect Security Policy?  High-profile 
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In its three years in office, the party appeared to do just that but with poor results, both 
from its own perspective and from that of its American alliance partner.  The DPJ 
mishandled reorganization plans for U.S. military installations in Okinawa, the emerging 
dispute with China over the Senkaku / Diaoyu Islands, and the nuclear plant disaster caused 
by the GEJE.  But a closer look shows that the party proved both less willing and less able 
to exert political influence than initially expected.  This reflected not only attributes of the 
party itself, but also the general nature of security policymaking. Ironically, the DPJ’s very 
pursuit of anti-bureaucratic policymaking and promotion of two-party competition did begin 
to expose security policy to greater political and public leverage, but where this occurred 
most thoroughly, the party stumbled most damagingly. Meanwhile, on many substantively 
important but less well-publicized or politically salient issues, the DPJ actually quietly 
progressed along a security policy trajectory that was familiar and constructive, and whose 
nuclear-policy elements largely maintained the status quo.43 Though this pattern may be 
reassuring to the U.S., it still suggests the need to be aware of the risk of politicization of 
previously under-the-radar security issues. The DPJ’s experience suggests that the 
management of security policy has new potential to vex all incumbent Japanese 
governments, DPJ-led or otherwise, and thereby to contribute to governance destabilization 
across the board in Japan – but we should also expect successor Japanese governments to 
recognize this dynamic and avoid such an aggressively political approach to security 
policymaking in the short-to-medium term.  This suggests, in turn, that the bureaucratic 
                                                   
43 For similar arguments concerning the DPJ’s maintenance of Japan’s security policy trajectory, if 
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stovepiping of nuclear policy is unlikely to be resolved through political will. 
The DPJ did not seek to exert political influence in order to engineer a radically different 
security policy.  Its policy positions with regard to security were not as distant from those of 
the LDP as many American (and Japanese) observers feared.  Though the party began 
mainly as a home for moderate defectors from the Social Democratic Party of Japan (SDPJ), 
it quickly began to receive defectors from the LDP as well and thereby take on a more 
conservative (and heterogeneous) cast.  If anything, the DPJ’s ascendance removed any 
remaining traces of the type of left-right foreign-policy polarization found in, say, South 
Korea.  Meanwhile, the DPJ included few politicians who specialized and politically invested 
in defense issues (though this comparative inattention to defense was not unique to the 
DPJ), and, unlike the LDP, made little effort to cultivate such policy expertise among its 
rank-and-file legislators. If anything, when the party attempted to differentiate itself from the 
LDP on these grounds, this reflected tactics rather than principle.   
More significant is that the DPJ approached the policymaking process differently from the 
LDP, in a way that attempted to amplify the influence of popular (public and party-driven) 
opinion. by emphasizing political leadership – unlike previous LDP governments, which 
relied more heavily upon bureaucracy for policy expertise.  Upon first taking office in 2009, 
the Hatoyama administration quickly consolidated policy decision-making power among a 
small group in the Kantei (Prime Minister’s Office) and Cabinet, isolating both foreign 
policy and defense bureaucrats and the party’s own non-Cabinet legislators. He then 
eliminated the DPJ’s Policy Affairs Research Council (PARC), a “shadow Diet committee” 
system in which DPJ legislators could engage in bureaucrat-led “study sessions,” something 
particularly valuable for the large majority of DPJ legislators who at any given time were not 
serving as Cabinet ministers or ministers’ deputies. Hatoyama also eliminated the Cabinet 
vice ministers’ meeting (jimu jikan kaigi), a regular coordination meeting held among 
administrative vice ministers (that is, the top non-politically-appointed official in each 
ministry) prior to Cabinet meetings. The DPJ viewed these as a symbol of politicians’ 
dependence on the bureaucracy. Meanwhile, the government established as the ultimate 
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decision-making body within each ministry the Three Political Appointees Meetings (seimu 
sanyaku kaigi) for ministers, deputy ministers (fuku daijin), and senior parliamentary vice 
ministers (seimu kan) – that is, for the only political appointees within each ministry. On 
security policy matters in particular, the DPJ also established a freestanding advisory panel, 
headed by former Defense Minister Kitazawa Toshimi, independent of both the Cabinet and 
the Policy Research Committee.44 
The DPJ’s structural reforms were driven by a deep sense of distrust and outright rejection 
of bureaucratic expertise (bureaucrats, amid this decline in policymaking potency, cultivated 
symmetrical distrust of DPJ policymakers).  But with each of its three successive yearlong 
administrations, the DPJ gradually backtracked farther away from its insistence on political 
leadership and the isolation of bureaucrats.  Following Hatoyama’s failed attempts to revise 
reorganization plans for Okinawa’s Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Futenma without the 
benefit of bureaucratic input and his subsequent resignation in May 2010, his successor, 
Kan, reinstated the PARC and bumon kaigi (Policy Department Meetings), and Kan’s 
successor, Noda, directed all of his cabinet members to “optimize the potential of the 
bureaucracy” and reinstated regular meetings among the administrative vice ministers of all 
government agencies. 
The DPJ certainly had a certain impact on Japanese security policy, but how much?  The 
clearest and best–known example, and the one that served as the party’s “first impression” 
upon its taking power, was the Hatoyama administration’s attempted re-negotiation of 
Futenma relocation plans between August 2009 and May 2010.  DPJ policymakers went out 
of their way to re-examine previously established agreements between Japan and the U.S., 
consulted defense and foreign affairs bureaucrats only minimally, and displayed poor 
coordination among themselves in the process – and were then widely blamed for policy 
failure.  The immediate end result was a reversion to the status quo ante preferred by the U.S., 
and the path to that result unnecessarily expended resources on both countries’ parts and 
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strained relations between the two.45  Other “high-profile stumbles” under DPJ rule included 
the Kan government’s failure to effectively respond to a Chinese trawler that rammed into a 
Japan Coast Guard vessel near the disputed Senkaku Islands, and a series of gaffes by novice 
DPJ Ministers of Defense displaying unfamiliarity with basic policy issues.46  
In a few areas, though, the DPJ successfully managed issues highly visible to the Japanese 
public.  Perhaps the clearest example was Operation Tomodachi (or “Friend”), the joint 
humanitarian assistance/disaster relief (HA/DR) effort undertaken by Japan’s Self-Defense 
Forces and the U.S. military following the GEJE.  Another DPJ policy initiative well 
received within Japan – though not by U.S. alliance managers – was the termination in 
January 2010 of the Japan Maritime Self Defense Forces’ (JMSDF) refueling operations in 
the Indian Ocean in support of U.S. and allied forces engaged in Afghanistan. In contrast 
with Futenma, Indian Ocean refueling offered an ideal opportunity for the DPJ to set itself 
apart clearly – but politically safely – from the LDP and the status quo of the Japan-U.S. 
alliance.  This was thanks to the highly asymmetrical political salience of the operation.  SDF 
deployments, even in comparatively safe and politically uncontroversial environments, are 
closely watched within Japan, but to the United States, the JMSDF’s contribution carried 
more symbolic than operational importance.  The DPJ’s quick withdrawal from the 
operation upon taking power – as promised in its election campaign – constituted a notable, 
if not extremely weighty, policy success for the party. 
Perhaps most notable, though, a significant number of lower-profile – and, not 
coincidentally, often more-complex – policy initiatives pushed by the DPJ maintained the 
status-quo trajectory of gradual expansion of the Japan Self Defense Force’s roles and 
capabilities strengthening of the U.S.-Japan alliance, including continued reliance on the U.S. 
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nuclear umbrella without expansion of Japan’s own nuclear-weapons capabilities or 
involvement. 
The DPJ maintained Japan’s ballistic missile defense (BMD) development and cooperation 
with the United States, and under Prime Minister Kan moved to increase the size of the 
Aegis fleet by two.47  It gradually pushed for the relaxation of the Three Principles of arms 
non-export, in part to ease participation in such U.S.-led ventures as BMD and the 
development of the next-generation F-35 fighter plane (though not to fruition, as noted 
below).48  It continued to push for the creation of a Japanese version of the U.S.’s National 
Security Council as a means of unifying and streamlining security and crisis management, an 
initiative previously proposed by LDP Prime Minister Abe Shinzou during his first 
administration and since taken up by him during his second.49  The DPJ also worked to 
improve relations with Asian neighbors other than China, particularly South Korea, contrary 
to early concerns that the party might align Japan more closely with China at the expense of 
the United States and other partners in Asia.  The party also maintained and even expanded 
SDF overseas deployment activity (tame by U.S. standards, perhaps, but significant by 
Japan’s).50 Finally, and most broadly, the DPJ issued National Defense Program Guidelines 
(NDPG) that could just as easily have been issued by the LDP, despite the DPJ’s having 
produced them through an enhanced process of political deliberation.51  What political 
influence there was on the NDPG process served mainly to reinforce the status quo – most 
notably, the failure to relax Japan’s Three Principles of Arms Exports as originally planned.52  
One simple rule of thumb that seems to have emerged from the DPJ’s experience (and is 
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applicable to more-experienced parties like the LDP as well) is that the party fared worse in 
those security policy areas more salient to the Japanese public – that is, on issues that 
politicians and citizens could easily find out about and digest well enough to threaten to 
pressure policymakers.  But relatively few security issues are politically salient.  Only some 
aspects of security policy align with longstanding political and historical themes, allow easy 
packaging and presentation by mass media and political actors, and thereby become easily 
comprehensible and/or politically motivating to average citizens.  In Japan, these include 
anything touching on Japan’s wartime history and subsequent constitutional constraints on 
military power., such as dispatches of the Self Defense Forces to violent areas, territorial 
disputes with Asian neighbors, U.S. military installations in Okinawa (though salience for 
this issue area is often low in mainland Japan), and revisions to the Constitution. Responses 
to immediate incidents and crises also tend to be highly salient.   
Many other issue areas fall “under the radar” and largely fail to penetrate voters’ 
consciousness, regardless of whether security policymakers and analysts recognize them to 
be substantively important.  These generally involve long-term or broad security strategy or 
infrastructure and/or more highly technical matters.  In Japan, examples include Self 
Defense Force assets and capabilities and most developments in U.S.-Japan alliance relations 
outside of Okinawan basing issues.  Note the distinction between responses to incidents and 
crises and policies enacted in anticipation of incidents and crises. Japan’s response to a North 
Korean missile launch will be highly salient to its citizens; Japan’s general strategy and policy 
toward the Six-Party Talks will not.  Specific decisions to dispatch the SDF to a war zone 
will be highly salient; changes to the general legal infrastructure surrounding such dispatches 
will not. 
Japan’s nuclear weapons policy, of course, is rooted in perhaps the most salient event in 
Japanese history, one that combines Japan’s wartime history and a man-made disaster:  the 
atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.  At the same time, nuclear weapons policy 
does have a large non-salient component as well.  Steps toward acquiring greater 
autonomous nuclear weapons capability that are tangible, explicit, and easy for the public (as 
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opposed to policy watchers) to understand, while incredibly high-stakes, are also rare.  In 
addition to actual use of the weapons, such steps would include weapons tests or explicit 
announcements of new capabilities or intentions to that end, including, say, withdrawal from 
relevant international compacts or internal Japanese policies.  Non-salient policy steps in this 
direction, though, would include anything short of such bold moves that nonetheless better 
establishes the legal, diplomatic, or technological foundations for such shifts.  And to the 
extent that critics are correct that a robust Japanese civil nuclear energy program undercuts 
the legitimacy of its anti-proliferation efforts because of the latent ability to transfer 
technology and other capabilities from the energy sector to weapons, this implies that the 
very advancement of the nuclear energy program constitutes a (formerly) non-salient, under-
the-radar advancement of weapons capability.   
Nuclear energy policy itself, meanwhile, had long been a policy area truly salient only in 
municipalities and regions targeted to host nuclear power plants, but it is now rooted in 
perhaps the most politically salient event in Japan since the end of World War II:  the 3/11 
disasters.  Indeed, nuclear energy can now be considered a more salient political realm than 
even nuclear weapons – and could have been considered so even before the 3/11 disasters – 
because the greater visibility of the issue, compared to nuclear weapons, outweighs its lower 
stakes.  The progress of the issue is trackable via the more easily-grasped metric of whether 
off-line nuclear power plants have come back on line or have been approved to do so – and 
with several dozen such plants in the country, there are frequent opportunities for such 
decisions, which in many cases constitute one of the largest political issues in the prefecture 
in which a plant is located.  The economic impact of the loss of nuclear energy, meanwhile, 
is felt on a daily basis by both opponents and proponents of re-starting the industry, and this 
effect stands to grow even more acute if and when the early success of Prime Minister Abe’s 
“Abe-nomics” policies begins to cool.53  Also (though this admittedly borders on the 
tautological), the simple fact that nuclear power remains a highly debatable issue, with many 
proponents remaining despite the 3/11 crises, keeps the issue front-and-center politically.  
                                                   
53 Martin Fackler, “Nuclear Issue in Limbo as Indecision Grips Japan,” The New York Times 
(February 11, 2014). 
  38 
This stands in contrast to nuclear weapons, attached to which a strong taboo understandably 
remains, and which few proponents are able to whole-heartedly support, even if they hold 
reasonable security-minded rationales for doing so. 
Such salience, in turn, both makes policy more error-prone and magnifies the errors – more 
than the successes – that do occur.  Political salience does not provide opportunities for 
public buy-in so much as opportunities for critique.  And in Japan in particular, “rally round 
the flag” effects that might counteract this dynamic are particularly weak, with the possible 
exception of responses to North Korean or Chinese provocations, or to humanitarian crises.  
Even then, though, security and foreign policy successes in Japan rarely trump economics as 
either the basis of citizens’ decisions in the voting booth or leaders’ claim to popularity or 
legitimacy.54  Japanese politicians gain little electoral capital from foreign and security policy 
expertise and accomplishment, as evidenced by the small number of politicians who 
specialize in these areas.  To borrow an example offered by Epstein and O’Halloran, security 
policy in a non-polarized but competitive party system may be like airline safety: the aim is to 
prevent failure, and there is little credit to be had when things go right.55  Salience may also 
make failure slightly more likely if politicians falter under the close scrutiny it attracts, or if 
salience entices them to take undue risks.  Of course, in a vicious cycle, policy failure does 
also reinforce the salience of the policy area.  Failure attracts disproportionate media and 
parliamentary attention.  
In the DPJ’s case, it faltered on highly salient security policy issues not because of the 
unpopularity of its policy stances, but because of perceived incompetence.  Security policy is 
becoming a proxy for competence, even if not yet a means to distinguish the main parties 
from each other on policy grounds.  This is especially so for “valence” issues over which 
citizens agree on a consensus end and disagree only about means, such as disaster relief or 
the desirability of avoiding nuclear weapons capabilities if possible given Japan’s security 
environment.  This is more likely to be so when major parties are relatively similar in their 
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security policy positions, but also, and more importantly, because citizens prove willing to 
judge parties’ competence regardless of how well formed their opinions are on the merits of 
various policies. 
These patterns imply that higher political salience for security policy issues may be 
undesirable from the perspective of Japanese governments, as well as that of the United 
States (this assumes a narrow goal of policy success, rather than, say, a deepening of 
Japanese deliberative democracy for its own sake, in which case more public awareness and 
political involvement in security affairs would be highly desirable by definition).  For 
Japanese ruling parties, popularization and politicization of security policy promises to be 
troublesome.  In turn, the United States should be concerned when it observes previously 
non-politically-salient issues being made more salient.  This occurred, for example, when the 
DPJ went out of its way to investigate past secret U.S-Japan nuclear agreements, thus 
making an otherwise obscure security issue more salient; it occurs when either the 
government or opposition attempts to politicize a security issue as a tactic within two-party 
competition, as with the DPJ’s promise to cease the JMSDF’s Indian Ocean refueling 
operations; or when the United States itself weighs in heavily on an issue, as it did in 
responding to Hatoyama’s questioning of Futenma relocation plans.  In the nuclear policy 
realm, the most likely such dynamic in the near future is the increased linkage of nuclear 
energy policy to nuclear weapons policy (whether the development of autonomous 
capabilities or the continued reliance on the U.S. umbrella).  As discussed above, nuclear 
power and weapons, despite their common components, have long been kept separate in 
Japan, but the increased salience of nuclear power issues may well have ripple effects that 
increase the salience of nuclear-weapons issues – in the minds of the public, at least, even if 
their respective bureaucratic structures remain stovepiped. 
At the same time, Japanese governments likely will try to redirect their limited political 
resources away from security issues and toward domestic concerns.  The LDP learned this 
lesson during Abe’s first term as prime minister, when voters repudiated him at the polls for 
his focus on foreign affairs.  The DPJ seemed to learn this lesson as its three years in 
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government went by.  It seemed to be aware of the salience-failure dynamic and to learn to 
avoid it.   
But despite their efforts, governments are unlikely to fully succeed in deemphasizing security 
concerns, which issues often emerge as unpredictable “exogenous shocks” that inevitably 
attract media and public attention, as seen with the Futenma re-negotiation and various 
maritime disputes between Japan and its neighbors.  The emergence of security as a proxy 
for competence, combined with the asymmetrical dynamic that gives politicians and 
governments little to gain from success and much to lose from mistakes, suggests that 
security policy, at least in the short term, might serve as a de facto and generic force that 
disciplines and thereby disadvantages incumbent governments – something similar to the 
generic “pains of governing” that produce secular-trend erosion in any government’s public 
support ratings with each additional month that that government serves.  Security now 
occupies a more prominent place among the many policy challenges Japanese governments 
must navigate and, inevitably, sometimes stumble upon.  This could be particularly hurtful 
for non-LDP governments, since those parties will have a “shorter leash.”  A generic 
“valence issue” dynamic, in which all governments stumble to some degree over security 
policy challenges, could harden into one in which the anti-LDP opposition, in particular, 
loses trust over foreign policy, as has tended to be the case for the Democratic Party in the 
United States.  This is not to suggest, though, that LDP governments will remain immune to 
possible backlash if they appear less than competent with regard to foreign affairs and 
security.   
WILL  PRIME  MINISTER  ABE  POLITICIZE  NUCLEAR  POLICY?  
As noted above, the DPJ’s three years in office represented a “most likely case” for the 
potential of politicization of security policy.  The party was explicitly willing to put its own 
political stamp on security policy, both as an expression of policy differences with the 
previously governing LDP and as a matter of principle with regard to how it felt policy 
should be made.  The party was also able to do so, if it so chose, in the sense that it enjoyed a 
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sizable Lower House majority and its control (with coalition partners) of the Upper House.  
In practice, though, the DPJ either encountered obstacles to imposing its political will or 
imposed it without producing particularly novel results.  This partly reflects the nature of the 
party itself, but also reflects the evolving Japanese political party system overall and the 
general nature of security policymaking in Japan.  It remains not only procedurally difficult 
but also politically unwise to make bold security-policy moves.  If the DPJ was constrained 
by these conditions, then other political actors might be even more so.   
The report here turns to assessing whether other political actors and forces now thought to 
have the potential to politicize security policy – Prime Minister Abe, the revived LDP in 
general, and new nationalist movements and parties like the Japan Restoration Party – 
should prove any more willing or able than the DPJ to do so.  It concludes they are also 
likely to have only muted influence, especially when it comes to moves away from the 
country’s nuclear-weapons status quo and towards more autonomous capability.  If anything, 
the most potent source of popular influence on security policy in the short- to medium-term 
points in the opposite direction where nuclear weapons are concerned: the anti-nuclear-power 
movement that has emerged in the aftermath of the 3/11 disasters.   
Keeping in mind the general lesson of the political danger of highly salient security policy 
issues, how likely is current Prime Minister Abe to politicize nuclear policy?  As noted above, 
more decisive political leadership has the potential to harmonize nuclear policy’s main 
strands of anti-proliferation, reliance on the U.S. nuclear umbrella, and robust pursuit of civil 
nuclear energy capabilities.  At the same time, political influence necessarily injects more 
volatility into policy outcomes than does gradualist bureaucratic leadership shielded from 
public opinion. 
Prime Minister Abe seems to represent another “most likely case” of political influence 
toward greater autonomous nuclear capabilities, in comparison with his LDP colleagues and 
predecessors.  While prime ministers in Japan still face more obstacles to unilateral 
leadership and imposition of their own policy preferences than do prime ministers 
elsewhere, their powers of leadership are certainly on the rise.  In Abe’s case, this mostly 
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reflects his individual characteristics as a political leader, though to a certain extent it also 
reflects changes within the LDP.   
First, Abe’s individual policy outlook is significantly more hawkish and nationalist than that 
of perhaps any Japanese prime minister since at least his grandfather, Kishi Nobusuke, who 
served in the 1950s, when progressive-conservative polarization had not yet cooled after the 
close of World War II and Japan had not yet settled into its “1955 System” of conservative 
dominance and emphasis on economic growth over security concerns or more pointed 
ideological conflict.  The scion of one of Japan’s political “first families,” with a grandfather 
and great uncle proceeding him as Prime Ministers and a father who would likely have done 
so as well if not for an untimely death due to illness, Abe first rose to prominence for 
reasons other than his lineage by taking hardline stances towards North Korea while serving 
in high LDP posts during Prime Minister Koizumi’s administration in the mid-2000s.56  Abe 
claimed a major role in restricting the return of Japanese citizens previously abducted by 
North Korea after the DPRK permitted them to visit Japan, and he vigorously pressed for 
sanctions after North Korean missile tests.  On the strength of this reputation (which was 
amplified by newly-emerging daytime-television “wide shows” eager to lavish attention on 
the sensational abduction issue and any telegenic politicians involved57), Abe succeeded the 
immensely popular Koizumi as Prime Minister in 2006.  Gradually, though, he began to be 
perceived to be overly reliant on the very policy strengths that first propelled him into office.  
Amid a still-stagnant economy, Abe put much emphasis on highly-salient foreign policy, 
security, and historical-memory issues, discussing revisions to the Constitution that would 
both expand the capabilities of the Self Defense Forces and promote a return to “patriotic 
education,” and making ill-advised statements regarding the Japanese government’s lack of 
culpability in the forced sexual slavery of “comfort women” during World War II.  This 
misplaced policy emphasis only added to wide variety of other challenges:  five scandals on 
the part of fellow LDP politicians, one of whom was forced to resign as Defense Minister 
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for having suggested that the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki might have been 
justified; widespread mismanagement of pension records and a slow government response to 
this issue; the reversal of Koizumi’s popular to decision to expel rebellious LDP lawmakers 
from the party in the run-up to the LDP’s landslide 2005 election victory; and, not least, the 
general disadvantage of his predecessor Koizumi having set an impossibly high bar of 
popularity.58   
Under Abe, the LDP suffered a devastating loss in the Upper House election of 2007, ceding 
control of that House to the DPJ, and giving that party its first significant hold on 
parliamentary power and putting it in position to block further Cabinet initiatives.  Several 
weeks later, Abe suddenly resigned as prime minister (though not as a member of the Lower 
House), citing both poor health and the notion that his presence only encouraged 
parliamentary gridlock.  He thus became the first in a succession of six post-Koizumi 
“musical chair” prime ministers to serve only about one year in the post before giving way to 
a new face. 
With this ignominious leadership history behind him, most political observers expected 
Abe’s retreat to the LDP backbenches to be followed by a retreat from electoral politics 
entirely.  Abe’s stature in his home electoral district in Yamaguchi Prefecture, however, 
remained robust enough for him to retain his parliamentary seat in the election of 2009 while 
most of his LDP colleagues were felled by the wave of anti-LDP sentiment that swept the 
DPJ into government for the first time.  And by the time the DPJ administrations of 
Hatoyama, Kan, and Noda had run their course, Abe had re-emerged as the LDP’s standard-
bearer, taking advantage of a shallow leadership pool amid his now-diminished LDP (and 
perhaps taking advantage of his comparative youth as well – most LDP Prime Ministers first 
take that job at too advanced an age to remain contenders even six years later, but Abe had 
begun in his early 50s). 
In his second, current term, Abe would seem well positioned to make more effective use of 
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his leadership position in pursuing his particular security-policy and nationalist aims.  His 
electoral mandate, first, is much stronger than before.  In his first term, he came into office 
on Koizumi’s coattails through an intra-party selection.  In his second, he came into office 
through a decisive trouncing of the DPJ in the Lower House election of 2012, with the LDP 
gaining a historic, near-super-majority-strength victory, and the DPJ reduced to 50-odd seats, 
only about half the size to which the LDP itself had been cut down in 2009, and barely larger 
than the third-largest party.  This overwhelming victory, in turn, served to purge any 
remaining hint of prior political failure and to re-legitimize his personal policy goals.   
At the same time, in the run-up to the election and in the early stages of his new 
administration, Abe conveyed to political analysts and Japanese citizens alike that he had 
learned hard lessons about policy priorities from his earlier term.  This served further to 
legitimize his security policy aspirations when they did appear, but more important has been 
the fact that these have not appeared as prominently.  Abe has made economic recovery his 
first priority, and his economic program – quickly dubbed “Abe-nomics” – quickly began to 
achieve results, giving him the popularity and political capital to pursue security initiatives on 
a now-less-scrutinized second track. 
He has not shied away from spending this capital.  In his first year in office, Abe took steps 
to begin a process of constitutional review, again with an eye toward establishing a firm basis 
for collective defense though re-interpretation of the Constitution if not outright 
amendment.  He has also begun to push against the Three Principles, exploring the 
possibility of exporting arms to international groups taking part in peacekeeping operations.  
He established a Japanese version of the National Security Council, thus further 
concentrating chief-executive power over security decision-making.  The end of his first full 
calendar year in office found Abe shepherding to passage a Special Intelligence Protection 
Act that aggressively sanctions leaks of classified information – over the objections of the 
majority of the Japanese public.59  Abe is pursuing expansion of the Self Defense Forces’ 
budget and capabilities, and has kept rhetoric over the disputed Senkaku / Daioyu Islands at 
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a high pitch. Perhaps even more ostentatious, and upsetting to the Chinese and South 
Korean governments, was Abe’s visit in late 2013, upon the one-year anniversary of his 
return to power, to the controversial Yasukuni Shrine, which honors the memory of World 
War II Class A war criminals among other Japanese soldiers.   
With regard to nuclear policy in particular, Abe himself has hewn to the status quo in public 
statements – but such high-ranking members of his party as LDP Secretary General Ishiba 
Shigeru have explicitly referred to the desirability of Japan’s maintaining the option to build 
nuclear weapons.60  This pattern echoes that seen during Abe’s first term as Prime Minister, 
during which Abe himself remained circumspect while closely-allied leaders of his party and 
government openly began to discuss the possibility of Japan’s acquiring nuclear weapons, 
especially immediately following North Korea’s 2006 missile and nuclear tests.61  And before 
serving as Prime Minister, when Abe himself was one such sub-prime ministerial party leader 
with more leeway to make frank security-policy pronouncements, he played the same “bad 
cop” role.  While Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary in 2002, Abe argued, controversially, that 
nuclear weapons with a range consistent with self-defense objectives would be consistent 
with Constitutional restrictions.62 
Abe has also forthrightly pushed to bring Japan’s nuclear reactors back on line, and has 
aggressively pushed for the export of nuclear power technology, including to aspiring 
nuclear-weapon power India.  By the end of February 2014, Abe had gone so far as to 
announce a draft of a revised Basic Energy Plan that described nuclear power as an 
“important baseload electricity source” and more concretely established the government’s 
openness to restarting off-line nuclear plants and building new ones.63  This reverses former 
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Prime Minister Kan’s determination to take and keep all of Japan’s nuclear plants offline (a 
policy not supported uniformly within Kan’s DPJ government or by his DPJ successor 
Noda, but not as formally and emphatically discarded by them). 
Abe also appears buoyed by an apparent rise in nationalism and security-mindedness among 
the Japanese public at large.  In the 2012 Lower House election that brought Abe and the 
LDP back to power, the LDP was not the only winner.  The even more avowedly nationalist 
Japan Restoration Party nearly won enough seats to overtake the DPJ as the LDP’s main 
challenger (although both the DPJ and JRP finished similarly far behind the LDP).  Maritime 
disputes with China over the Senkaku / Diaoyu islands and with South Korea over 
Takeshima / Tokdo have encouraged a spike in xenophobically tinged nationalism against 
these two countries, to such a degree as to prompt violent incidents against ethnic Korean 
residents of Japan.64  Meanwhile, nuclear-test and kinetic provocations on the part of North 
Korea have made Japanese citizens more amenable to the idea of a more robust defense 
against that country – a sentiment that Abe, with his personal history of hardline stances 
against North Korea, is particularly well positioned to take advantage of.  And while such 
sentiments are nominally directed at North Korea, they may be exploited to push for 
advances in defense capabilities that are in practice directed at China as well (or, to echo the 
terms used above, the high salience of North Korean provocations helps propel security-
capability expansions that would otherwise be of low salience to the public, even though the 
latter might have proceeded with relatively little opposition in any case precisely because of 
that lower salience).65 
An observer would be forgiven for observing this policy record and extrapolating it to 
expect Abe eventually, in the later portions of his likely extended time in office, to push, 
slowly but surely, for expansion in Japan’s nuclear weapons capabilities.  But it seems more 
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likely that the opposite pattern will hold.  It is precisely because Abe holds so many 
comparatively ambitious security policy goals that he is unlikely to push for what would be 
extremely ambitious steps towards establishing greater nuclear autonomy. 
The public-support threshold that a nuclear-expansion effort would need to clear is 
extremely high.  In isolation, when asked in opinion polls whether one is comfortable with 
the notion of considering a move toward autonomous nuclear-weapons capability, Japanese 
citizens might be more positive than before.  But in practice, public comfort with nuclear 
weapons would first require the public to collectively achieve comfort with at least four 
inter-related intermediate steps, each of which itself would constitute a major 
transformation:  1) Article 9 of the Constitution, through which Japan now renounces the 
right to wage war, would need to be amended; 2) the Three Non-Nuclear Principles (no 
possession or manufacture of nuclear weapons, nor permitting their introduction into 
Japanese territory), which are not law but have taken on the de facto weight of law (as have 
their counterpart Three Principles of Arms Exports noted above), would need to be 
abandoned; 3) the Self Defense Forces would need to be permitted to acquire offensive 
capabilities, thus breaking from their history of possessing only (or at least maintaining that 
they possess) “exclusively defense-oriented” capabilities; 4) and, finally, more amorphously 
and perhaps most difficult – the Self Defense Forces would need to earn widespread trust as 
a professional military organization, something that even the SDF’s widely-praised 
performance in the humanitarian assistance operation following the 3/11 disasters is still far 
from producing.66   Any one of these objectives would consume practically all of a Japanese 
administration’s political capital.  Indeed, Abe has already begun to spend political capital on 
Constitutional revision, which in most contexts other than nuclear weapons policy would 
represent any administration’s crowning achievement, not simply an intermediate step. In 
Japan, even firmly establishing that nuclear weapons are a legitimate option would qualify as 
significant.  The political capital involved in making significant steps toward nuclear weapons 
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capability would simply be too great. 
Besides this basic budgetary limit on political ambition, one can point to other conditions 
that will likely discourage Abe from pursuing politically driven steps away from the nuclear 
status quo.  Economics also plays a role.  First, that Abe has been able to pursue his security-
policy goals without debilitating legislative and public pushback thus far is largely due to the 
fact that his economic program was rolled out first, and, much more important, that this 
program has actually proven successful.  This is perhaps the first time in two decades that 
Japanese citizens have viewed an economic upturn not as a temporary fluctuation or as 
artificially manufactured through government stimulus unsustainable over the long term, but, 
rather, as the result of systematic and durable economic policy.  That said, Abe’s economic 
success over his first year or so of this second term is by no means guaranteed to last.  If the 
current comparatively high economic tide were to recede, and if Abe were thereby left 
stranded with only revisionist security policy to his name, public patience with his priorities 
might quickly grow thin.67  At the same time, a nuclear weapons program (as opposed to, 
say, the export of nuclear technology) is itself a direct drain on the treasury, even in an 
economy as large as Japan’s, and, given the existence of the U.S. nuclear umbrella, is likely to 
be viewed by many as an extravagance.68 
Finally, Abe’s recent political history, for him more than for other LDP leaders, discourages 
costly moves away from the nuclear status quo.  More than any other LDP prime minister – 
again, since at least his grandfather Kishi in the 1950s – Abe has hard personal experience 
with the dangers of over-reliance on security policy as a signature legislative achievement.  
And Abe’s visit to Yasukuni Shrine and heavy-handed passage of “state secrets” legislation 
in December 2013 has already dealt him his first acute drop in Cabinet support.  At the same 
time, as a well-established security hard-liner (again, by Japanese standards, at least), Abe has 
no need to go out of his way to prove his bona fides in this regard.  If anything, Abe has a 
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need to avoid confirming some of the public’s perception of him as an extreme hawk.  If 
Japanese citizens were to trust any leader with taking steps away from the nuclear status quo, 
it would more likely be someone other than him.  He has retained the support of most 
citizens, but he has also conditioned them to be on guard for extremism. 
This also applies, in a weaker form, to parliamentarians within Abe’s own LDP.  The LDP’s 
current leaders below and beyond Abe do, as a group, focus more on defense issues than 
their predecessors.  Ishiba Shigeru is chief among these, having been one of the few 
politicians in either party to have long concerned himself with defense and foreign policy 
issues rather than more voter-friendly domestic concerns; others include Koike Yuriko and 
Ishihara Nobuteru.  But the LDP remains a broad center-right party, with significant 
portions resistant to nuclear weapons either on principle or for the expense they would 
entail.  The LDP is also a party whose rank-and-file members are comparatively well 
empowered, in contrast to the DPJ’s backbenchers.69  They enjoy bases of electoral support 
independent of the central party apparatus and have greater ability to foment intra-party 
dissension.   
The need to avoid antagonizing parliamentarians applies more strongly, meanwhile, to the 
LDP’s coalition partner Koumeitou (the Clean Government Party).  Koumeitou is a lay-
Buddhist party that began as a peace-promoting member of the anti-LDP opposition.  
Though Koumeitou has shifted to the right over the last three decades – and, in the last 
decade or so, has done so precisely to make itself a palatable coalition partner for the LDP – 
an issue as salient and extreme as nuclear weapons might well test that party’s ability to 
compromise.  This is likely even more true of Koumeitou’s rank-and-file voters than of its 
party organization and leadership – and the LDP values Koumeitou more for its ability to 
deliver votes to LDP candidates than for its legislators’ contributions to parliamentary 
majorities (with the notable exception of possible Constitutional revision, in which 
Koumeitou’s delegation would be necessary for the LDP to achieve super-majority support).  
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The LDP will almost certainly regress to the mean in its vote support at the next election, at 
which time Koumeitou’s cooperation will become even more valuable.   
It should be noted that the need to rely on coalition partners to form a government and 
make policy is one that now applies across the political spectrum in Japan’s increasingly 
fragmented party system.  And the more such “veto players” whose buy-in is required for 
policy change, the less likely policy change becomes, especially when it comes to the 
dramatic change that a departure from Japan’s nuclear status quo would represent.70 
It should also be noted that Abe represents a particularly aggressive brand of security 
policymaking even within the LDP.  Given his current popularity, and the fact that no 
national election is likely to be called again until the summer of 2016, Abe is likely to remain 
in office for a considerable length of time by Japanese standards, bucking the recent trend of 
single-year prime ministers (a trend that Abe himself kicked off, as noted above).  But there 
is no particular reason to think that he is representative of a new breed of LDP leaders.  
When he is eventually replaced, the likelihood that that new LDP chief will pursue 
revisionist nuclear policy should grow even smaller. 
The LDP has always granted more deference to bureaucratic opinion.  It was the precedent 
of such LDP deference that made the DPJ appear politically activist toward traditional 
bureaucratic policymakers.  It is true that the notion of enhanced  “leadership by politicians” 
(seiji shudo) had first been made by LDP administrations, pre-dating the DPJ’s rule. Some 
argue that the trend toward “politicians’ leadership” was originally set when Prime Minister 
Hashimoto first established legislation to reorganize the ministries in 1998.  Abe himself 
during his first term in 2006-2007, sought to enhance policymaking capacity among the 
prime minister’s staff by increasing the number of special assistants to the prime minister 
(shusho hosakan) and establishing a Japanese-style national security council.  
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However, when it comes to security policy, we should expect the LDP to concentrate its 
political-influence efforts on more electorally lucrative domestic sectors such as construction 
and agriculture, especially under future prime ministers who, unlike Abe, don’t happen to 
have made their political reputations on hardline security stances.  Also, bureaucrats 
themselves may grow more willing and better able to resist the new politicization of security 
policymaking as time passes.   
OTHER  PARTY  SYSTEM  ACTORS  AND  EFFECTS  
Another potential source of political influence on security and nuclear policy is the new 
Japan Restoration Party (JRP). Even more than Abe, the JRP is unabashedly hawkish, 
populist, and nationalist.  One of its two co-leaders, Ishihara Shintarou, is perhaps the most 
prominent and outspoken of Japan’s extreme conservatives.  In Richard Samuels’ convincing 
taxonomy, Ishihara is the only politician (as opposed to, say, professors and cartoonists) 
named as representative of the quadrant of Japanese security-policy space that favors both a 
robust Japanese military capability and the weakening of the U.S.-Japan alliance to allow for 
greater Japanese autonomy (Abe, by contrast, shares the first of these two positions but not 
the second).71  In Ishihara’s career as a writer, Lower House member, and governor of 
Tokyo, he has, among other acts, more than once stated clearly that Japan should build 
nuclear weapons to defend against China; threatened to purchase the disputed Senkaku / 
Diaoyu Islands and forced DPJ Prime Minister Noda to preemptively purchase them 
instead, aggravating Japan-China relations; and often been accused of racism for, as an 
example, warning of the crime-committing danger posed by non-Japanese residents of Asian 
and other foreign descent in the event of an earthquake.72  The party’s other co-leader, 
Hashimoto Tooru, a political newcomer and populist former governor of Osaka prefecture 
and mayor of Osaka City, has made statements defending practices concerning wartime 
“comfort women” and suggesting that Japan might benefit from dictatorship.  Both Ishihara 
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and, in a reversal from his earlier stance, Hashimoto, were also dismissive of the post-3/11 
anti-nuclear-power movement during their time as chief executives in Tokyo and Osaka, 
respectively.73  In the most recent Tokyo gubernatorial election, the JRP backed Tamogami 
Toshio, a former Air Self Defense Forces general best known as having been dismissed from 
his JASDF post for winning an essay contest designed to justify Japanese colonial rule in 
Asia. 
If the JRP were a minor extremist party, as most of Japan’s post-war political history might 
have suggested would be the case, then this would be of little concern. But, as noted above, 
while the JRP emerged only just before the 2012 Lower House election through the merger 
of several smaller newly formed parties, it won more than 50 Lower House seats in that 
election.  This was not only a robust start to its political life, but also one that nearly rivalled 
the suddenly struggling DPJ.74  As a newly ascendant party, the JRP appears poised to 
undercut the DPJ’s appeal as the only viable alternative to the LDP.  And since it locates 
itself to the right of the LDP on policy, it has every incentive to distinguish itself from the 
LDP by moving even further to the right.  At the same time, it enjoys a certain amount of 
bargaining leverage vis-à-vis the LDP.  As one of several parties supporting Constitutional 
revision, it stands to help the LDP construct the parliamentary super-majority necessary for 
that effort, and seems even more willing to do so than the LDP’s own coalition partner 
Koumeitou. 
However, the flash of the JRP’s initial victory and the sensational nature of its leaders belie 
structural flaws that will likely limit the JRP’s ability to maintain anything close to its current 
parliamentary strength, let alone an ability to extract concessions on nuclear policy.  There is 
little to suggest that the JRP will escape the fate of other new Japanese parties who burst 
onto the scene with promising campaign showings and then dwindled into irrelevance within 
                                                   
73 Richard Samuels, 3.11: Disaster and Change in Japan (Cornell University Press, 2013). 
74 Steven R. Reed, “Challenging the Two-party System:  Third Force Parties in the 2012 Election,” 
pp. 72-83 in Robert Pekkanen, Steven R. Reed, and Ethan Scheiner, eds., Japan Decides 2012:  The 
Japanese General Election (London:  Palgrave Macmillan, 2013). 
  53 
one or two election cycles.75  The party likely gained votes as much as a vehicle for anti-DPJ 
protest as for its own stances.  Its politicians have little experience.  When its initial tide of 
vote support inevitably recedes by the next election, most of its candidates will likely either 
lose convincingly or defect to the LDP.  In addition, unlike most small new parties, the JRP’s 
unusual combination of a dual leadership structure – with two highly charismatic leaders – 
has served to build in internal strife between these two co-leaders and their respective camps 
of supporters.   
Perhaps a more genuine potential source of politicization of nuclear and security policy can 
be found in system-level party system dynamics – that is, the attributes of the system as a 
whole, as opposed to those of any particular party.  Here, the threat of politicization is 
mixed.  The Japanese political system as a whole is growing more popularized, driven by 
voter pressures and preferences rather than by party bosses or bureaucrat.  And the decline 
of polarization among parties, counterintuitively, actually encourages parties to compete with 
each other over security-policy performance.  But the apparent return to dominance of the 
LDP is likely to undercut these trends, draining the system of competitive incentives.  
Japan’s policymaking process has grown more exposed to popular and political influence in 
recent years, in a manner reminiscent of the early 20th-century Progressive era in the United 
States. Major parties now select their leaders through primaries rather than deliberations 
among party elites. The prime ministership has grown “presidentialized,” with prime 
ministers serving as the public face of their parties and as the vehicle for their parties’ 
success rather than the other way around.76  Election results had grown more volatile even as 
the set of viable national parties grew comparatively more stable (until immediately prior to 
the late-2012 Lower House election), with major parties’ shares of the Diet swinging wildly 
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from one national election to the next, and with even established leaders vulnerable to defeat 
in their home districts as partisan tides rose and fell.  None of these processes particularly 
selects for leaders with policy knowledge, as opposed to political skill (these are not mutually 
exclusive in theory, but appear to be at least partly so in practice).  This is particularly the 
case for foreign and security policy knowledge, given the comparatively small attention paid 
to such matters by most Japanese voters. This increasing popularization of the political 
process also tends to yield shorter leadership careers – as illustrated by the short tenures of 
all Japanese prime ministers other than Koizumi over the last fifteen years – and thus a 
higher “burn rate” through whatever policy expertise does exist among political leaders.   
Meanwhile, the decline in party polarization actually produces more politicization of security 
policy. The 1955 System paired a center-right LDP government with an opposition Socialist 
party that hewed strongly to the left on security and foreign policy and (not coincidentally) 
remained significantly smaller and less electorally viable than the LDP.  Under these 
conditions, the parties’ separation on policy grounds was vast and clear – but so much so 
that the opposition’s stance so delegitimized in the eyes of all but its own supporters, 
transforming security policy debates into ritual exercises unlikely to translate into political 
pressure on the LDP. Now, Japan’s major parties are close enough “on the merits” with 
regard to security to leave security policy open for real contestation. This allows security to 
become a front-burner issue. 
And if security policy grows more politicized, it is difficult to imagine that senior bureaucrats 
will be immune.  It may become difficult for a director-general who worked for a one party’s 
minister to stay on the same job for another party’s. The same might be true of the close-
knit community of non- (but often former-) government security experts within Japan’s 
universities and its small but potentially influential network of think tanks.  
On the other hand, these dynamics – the emergence of a genuinely competitive but less 
polarized party system – can hardly be taken for granted yet in Japan.77  They assume that 
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the DPJ will rebound from its historic 2012 loss just as the LDP did after its serious loss in 
2009 – perhaps not as gloriously so, but at least enough to continue to challenge the LDP 
and provide voters with a viable and broadly-palatable alternative.78  But the DPJ faces 
harder obstacles than the LDP did during its time as a humbled opposition party.  In both 
2009 and 2012, small opposition parties gained back a large share of votes simply by 
providing the single obvious, default alternative to an unpopular government.  But now, the 
DPJ must also differentiate itself from the JRP, from charismatic independents, and from 
other “third-force” rivals for anti-LDP opposition, and it lacks a distinctive platform beyond 
“we’re not the LDP.” The currently-diminished DPJ did shed (against its will) some of its 
traditional-conservative elements in its 2012 defeat, and this might allow it to emphasize its 
fiscal conservatism, social progressivism, and comparatively restrained attitude towards 
resurgent nationalism and realist approach to security policy – or, more succinctly, this might 
let it become known as the party least likely to put its foot in its mouth over intra-Asian 
history issues – and this might let the DPJ set itself apart from both the LDP and the JRP.79  
But appeals based on general image and competence will likely matter more – and the DPJ is 
disadvantaged here as well.  It loses on “freshness” to the JRP and on competence to the 
LDP.  The DPJ has also failed to develop durable non-policy strategies that provide a 
fallback position during bad times – distributing pork barrel or recruiting high-quality 
candidates, for example.  Similarly, the party has not exploited prefectural or municipal 
elections to provide itself a fallback position in which to install promising future candidates 
and groom them for the next election.  The DPJ continues to refrain from approaching local 
elections aggressively and thus remains essentially a minor party at the local level, and its 
party branches are simply campaign vehicles for comparatively small number of incumbents 
who run them. 
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ANTI-­‐‑NUCLEAR-­‐‑POWER  BACKLASH  AS  PRO-­‐‑STATUS-­‐‑QUO  POLITICIZATION  
Alongside Japan’s individual political parties and its party system as a whole, changes in 
grassroots public opinion can also be seen as a potential source of political pressure away 
from Japan’s nuclear-policy status quo.  Two streams of public opinion in this vein have 
been alluded to above:  a gradual warming to the formerly taboo notion of Japanese 
autonomous nuclear weapons capabilities, and an apparent rise in nationalism.  The former 
has gradually been growing with the passing of the generations that directly witnessed 
Japan’s atomic bombings and the more general privations of war, and that in turn formed 
the backbone of Japan’s peace and nonproliferation movements.  Younger generations treat 
security policy, including nuclear weapons, more pragmatically, and their security 
consciousness is more strongly shaped by the immediate nuclear threat posed by North 
Korea and the larger but latent threat posed by China.  The rise in nationalism shares some 
of the same roots, but in recent years has been more acutely spurred by tensions with China 
and South Korea over interpretations of World War II-era history, which itself is partly a 
product of political reform and increasing economic competitiveness on the part of those 
two neighbors; and by conflict over disputed island territories. 
But these have been undercut quite dramatically by the response to the 3/11 disasters:  the 
earthquake and tsunami that both caused massive destruction and dislocation in the 
Touhoku (northeast) region of Japan, and, more important, the resulting catastrophic nuclear 
power plant accidents in Fukushima, whose impact reached as far geographically as the 
Tokyo metropolitan area, and more symbolically, across the entire nation.  The Fukushima 
incident immediately triggered a resurgence of the anti-nuclear power movement in Japan, 
and quickly enlarged it to national scale.80  This recent wave of public opposition to nuclear-
power, though both newly-emergent and no longer as vocal as it was at its immediate post-
disaster peak, is much more robust and mainstream than any apparent resurgence in either 
Japanese nationalism or pro-nuclear weapons sentiment, and is likely to remain so even as 
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time passes after the Fukushima incidents.  
Anti-nuclear-power sentiment in Japan quickly became widespread in the aftermath of the 
3/11 disasters.  Within a few months, up to three-quarters of opinion-poll respondents 
voiced support for the complete phasing out of Japan’s reliance on nuclear power, and as 
little as one percent voiced support for increasing Japan’s nuclear power supply.81   
Anti-power opinion not only resides collectively among broadly diffused individuals, but also 
is cultivated and transmitted, in part, by a genuine movement, with established organizational 
infrastructure and broad appeal.  This movement enjoys an organizational base that predated 
the 3/11 disaster, largely in the form of municipal- and prefectural-level campaigns to 
oppose the siting of nuclear plants in a variety of provincial cities.82  In many prefectures in 
Japan, the question of whether a given local nuclear plant would be allowed to be 
constructed or maintained represented the main issue in gubernatorial campaigns, similar to 
the role of military base politics in Okinawa prefecture.  The pro-plant side was generally 
represented by government officials and utility companies, plus the power plant labor force; 
the opposition movements were more broad-based.  Both these sides proved durable over 
decades of gubernatorial campaigns. In recent years, even before the Fukushima incidents 
(but more regularly and dramatically afterwards), governors themselves have begun to switch 
sides and question the desirability of power plant operations.  Even in highly centralized 
Japan, these governors enjoy significant power to constrain power generation, and, in the 
process, to legitimize the anti-power stance. 
Since the 3/11 disasters in Fukushima, though, a nationwide movement has been grafted 
onto this more piecemeal, localized foundation.  The issue has spread well beyond the areas 
immediately affected by either the Fukushima disasters themselves or by other nuclear 
plants. 
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This development was not immediate.  For more than a year after 3/11, political protest 
outside Fukushima itself proved rare.  But as opposition petitions in major urban areas 
began to suffer rejection from political leaders, mobilization began to build – to a large 
extent through decentralized calls to action on the part of large numbers of smaller non-
governmental organizations.83  Demonstrations against nuclear power began to bring tens of 
thousands of people into the streets – by far the largest protests since the 1960 
demonstration against the signing of the U.S.-Japan Security treaty.84  In a country where 
protest demonstrations of any size are extremely rare outside Okinawa (in contrast to, say, 
South Korea), such mass mobilization captures the attention of citizens well beyond those 
who take part in the protests themselves. 
Of course, as discussed above, nuclear power and nuclear weapons are two distinct areas of 
policy, and they have been dealt with in Japan via two comparatively autonomous and 
stovepiped policy communities.  But at the level of public opinion, the barrier between these 
two policy realms is much more porous.  An anti-nuclear-power movement has great 
potential to become linked to or re-purposed into an anti-nuclear-weapons movement.  This 
is partly because of the technological connection between the two:  as noted above, nations 
with comprehensive nuclear power industries, not to mention the general technological 
resources found in Japan, are well-positioned to become nuclear weapons producers if they 
so choose.  Indeed, as noted above, the simple presence of Japan’s robust nuclear power 
industry is sometimes calls into question Japan’s commitment to nonproliferation, even 
absent any particular movement toward a nuclear weapons program.   
But this technological connection is not necessarily what drives citizen-level linkage between 
nuclear power and nuclear weapons.  The simple fact that these two issue areas have 
“nuclear” in common is enough.  Even if nuclear power generation and nuclear weapon 
creation were to rely on entirely different processes and technologies, opposition to the 
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former naturally seems to promote opposition to the latter. And such opposition is likely to 
remain a political force that more than counteracts any revisionist positive public opinion 
toward nuclear weapons driven by nationalism, the dissolution of anti-nuclear taboos (and 
perhaps even the growing salience of threats from North Korea or China).  Though 
Japanese citizens’ increasing openness to nuclear weapons, rooted in the simple waning of 
taboos or recognition of a more threatening geopolitical environment, is real, it is passive 
and latent.  More citizens may support the idea of nuclear weapons when asked by a pollster, 
but there exists no significant non-governmental organization, activist movement, or other 
element of civil society proactively dedicated to augmenting Japan’s nuclear-weapon 
capability.  Increasing nationalism that might be harnessed in support of nuclear weapons, 
meanwhile, is more intense than this, but confined to a narrow sliver of the Japanese 
population.  Active nationalists receive a great deal of media attention, but a closer look at 
their support base and political achievements finds little in the way of significant gains (the 
recent and likely ephemeral success of the JRP notwithstanding).85   
Anti-nuclear-power opinion is more intense, more broad, and more institutionalized and 
organized.  The anti-nuclear-power movement has the benefit of dealing with a tangible, 
“not in my backyard (NIMBY),” quality-of-life problem.86  The safety issues surrounding 
nuclear power generation are viewed as immediate problems with immediate consequences, 
as opposed to the threat of nuclear attack, whose impact would be immeasurably larger but 
whose likelihood is too small to sustain political interest.  Nuclear power’s “NIMBY-ness” is 
also important because it has the potential to transcend progressive-conservative divides. 
Activism is spurred not only by the simple magnitude of the disasters themselves, but also 
their enduring media appeal.  Daytime “wideshows,” for example, mentioned above as one 
important medium for keeping the North Korea abduction story alive, have done their part 
with regard to nuclear power as well.  The invisible yet significant dangers to health and food 
safety are immediately graspable even by politically less-sophisticated viewers. 
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There is also an element of fortuitous political geography that makes the anti-power stance 
politically potent and a pro-power stance more politically risky.  First, the Fukushima 
accident was initially feared to threaten the safety of residents of the entire Tokyo 
metropolitan area, who make up the largest geographical voting bloc in the country.  Though 
the LDP is often portrayed as a rurally-focused party that depends little on large 
metropolitan areas for vote support, the party has actually long done well in Tokyo and 
other large cities’ more blue-collar areas, and this is even more the case now that the DPJ has 
made inroads in rural areas and the LDP has come to rely on support from its coalition 
partner Koumeitou’s urban strongholds.  At the same time, the Touhoku region, the site of 
all three components of the GEJE disaster, itself happens to be the rural conservative region 
in which the DPJ and anti-LDP opposition has threatened the LDP most, largely because it 
is the home region of former-DPJ leader Ichiro Ozawa and close to the home regions of 
former DPJ leaders Hatoyama and Tsutomu Hata, among others.  Since this region is more 
politically divided than others of its type in Japan, its political sensitivities are granted more 
deference. 
The easily graspable appeal of the anti-nuclear-power issue allows it to be exploited widely 
within Japan. The Tokyo prefecture governor’s election of early 2014 is a telling example.  
The election was called suddenly upon the resignation of the incumbent due to a political 
funding scandal, and soon was partly transformed into a referendum on nuclear power 
generation upon the attention-getting entry of former prime minister and former Kumamoto 
Prefecture governor Hosokawa Morihiro, who declared himself a single-issue anti-nuclear-
power candidate.87  This development emerged in a Tokyo prefecture that, again, was indeed 
significantly connected to the Fukushima disaster, by virtue of both its relative proximity to 
the plant and the Tokyo Prefectural Government’s status as the largest single stockholder in 
the Tokyo Electric Power Company, which owns the Fukushima plant indirectly affected by 
the Fukushima disaster.  But, still, Tokyo was only indirectly affected by the disaster itself, 
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with not a single nuclear power plant, and with any number of other issues potentially at 
stake, at least by comparison to smaller and more rural prefectures.  That nuclear power 
might prove one of many issues now important to Tokyo voters in a local-level election, as 
noted immediately above, seems reasonable; that it would be perceived, by national media if 
not by the preponderance of Tokyo voters themselves, as the signature issue of the 
campaign seems more surprising and significant.  Anti-power candidate Hosokawa was 
backed most prominently by none other than former LDP prime minister Koizumi, who 
had already begun to emerge from retirement to oppose his former party on the issue.88   
At the same time, some point to the results of this very Tokyo gubernatorial election as a 
sign that citizen mobilization around opposition to nuclear power has already begun to taper 
off, not even three years removed from 3/11.  Hosokawa not only lost the election, but 
came in third place by a large margin.  The loosely-LDP-affiliated winner, Youichi Masuzoe, 
gained 43 percent of the vote, a second anti-power candidate supported only by the Japan 
Communist Party and Social Democratic Party of Japan gained 20 percent, and Hosokawa, 
supported by the DPJ and DPJ offshoot People’s Life Party, gained only 19 percent.89  Soon 
afterwards, as if he had waited for such a concrete sign that Japan’s anti-power sentiment 
had begun to recede, Prime Minister Abe made his Basic Energy Plan announcement 
reaffirming the place of nuclear power in Japan’s energy mix.  Even before this election, 
some observers had noted that large-scale public demonstrations are now “in policymakers’ 
rearview mirror,” with crowds of tens of thousands who massed at the demonstrations’ peak 
roughly one to two years after the disaster starting to dwindle down to the hundreds.90  More 
generally, it does seem reasonable to expect citizens’ ire to cool as time passes, and to expect 
the more deeply institutionalized and entrenched “nuclear village” of establishment nuclear 
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power advocates – utilities and other industrial allies, the regulatory bureaucracy, and pro-
power researchers – to eventually outlast a newer and more atomized citizens’ movement. 
But even if anti-power public sentiment and public mobilization begin to fade, they might 
still retain enough latent potency to remain a significant factor in nuclear weapons 
discussion.  Indeed, anti-power sentiment might prove even more potent when linked to 
nuclear weapons issues than it is within the nuclear power debate itself.  Nuclear power, 
again, is a more immediately divisive issue, with proponents able to depend on both the 
“nuclear village” and a broad appeal to economic necessity.  Nuclear weapons are much 
easier to oppose.  Latent distrust of nuclear power – and the general distrust in government 
that the Fukushima disaster engendered – might well still be sufficiently potent to contribute 
additional opposition when applied to nuclear weapons debates if policymakers were to 
move at all beyond discussion to concrete steps towards nuclear weapons capabilities.  And 
since Japan’s Self Defense Forces, despite their stellar performance in Operation 
Tomodachi, are still not necessarily perceived as a more competent and trustworthy 
institution than power companies, there may be a smooth transition from concern over 
utilities’ ability to safely handle nuclear material to concern over the SDF’s ability to safely 
handle nuclear weapons.  Note also that even a hypothetically revitalized nuclear power 
industry might even prove hostile to the development of such capability, despite its ability to 
provide much of the technological foundation for enhanced nuclear weapons capability, 
since a nuclear weapons program would compete directly with nuclear power producers for 
fuel.91  
It also seems imperative not to impute too much in the way of a single-issue mandate to the 
results of a single election like the Tokyo governor’s race, especially in this case.  Though 
Hosokawa styled himself as the champion of maintaining constraints on nuclear power 
production, he was a poor candidate otherwise.  He emerged to contest a snap election after 
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a long period of retirement from politics, was saddled with a shaky political image after 
having abruptly left the prime ministership two decades prior and an aristocratic image that 
plays poorly outside of his home prefecture of Kumamoto (from whose former lords he is 
descended), and was forced to compete for the anti-nuclear vote with the eventual runner-
up, who lacked Hosokawa’s name recognition but enjoyed the organizational support of 
Tokyo’s progressive political machinery.  If anything, what seems most significant is that 
such an election, detached from any debate over particular nuclear power plants, could so 
quickly be exploited and converted at all into what was widely perceived as a nuclear-power 
referendum, not that the most vocal of the anti-power candidates ultimately lost. 
This point applies more generally.  We should be wary of reading too much in the way of 
security-policy mandates into election results, especially when dealing with large-scale 
national or prefectural elections more complex than a narrow referendum (or single-issue 
elections genuinely tantamount to a narrow referendum), and especially when considering 
such high-salience, high-stakes policy areas as nuclear weapons.  Samuels and Schoff, for 
example, argue that the 2012 return to power of the pro-nuclear-power Abe, juxtaposed with 
polling that shows widespread “popular opinion against all things nuclear in Japan . . .  is a 
reminder that overwhelming majorities can vote against their polled preferences and that 
even democratic governments can act independently of public opinion.”92  They continue in 
this vein with regard to nuclear weapons:  “The connection of public opinion to 
policymaking is particularly tenuous with regard to national security. . . . [T]he decision to 
forgo an independent nuclear arsenal was based on realist calculations amid U.S. pressure, 
not on polling data.  Campbell and Sunohara’s conclusion is correct that ‘although public 
sentiment against nuclear weapons remains strong, its ability to fully inhibit the decisions of 
Japanese leaders should not be exaggerated.’”93  But Japanese voters in 2012 chose the LDP 
simply as an alternative to what they perceived to be an incompetent DPJ government, not 
as an endorsement of the LDP’s or Abe’s policy positions themselves.  It is certainly true 
that policymakers can easily ignore public opinion on security matters when the matters in 
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question are low-salience and the public neither feels strongly about them nor cares to keep 
abreast of policy decisions.  Even on a high-salience, high-stakes issue like nuclear weapons, 
ignoring public opinion might be politically safe when it is the public that supports policy 
revision and elite policymakers who aim to reaffirm the non-nuclear status quo. But to do 
the opposite and defy public opinion in order to depart from the non-nuclear status quo on 
a high-salience issue seems much more risky, as Abe’s first prime ministerial term and the 
DPJ’s time in office both show.  Getting elected despite unacted-upon differences with the 
public over nuclear weapons is one thing; getting re-elected after defying the public over 
nuclear weapons is another. 
Finally, and perhaps more to the point as a reason not to assume that anti-nuclear power 
public opinion has already reached its peak as a damper on any move toward nuclear 
weapons capability:  the Fukushima accident has not yet ended.  Incidents such as high-
volume spills of radioactive water continue to occur, and accusations of clean-up 
mismanagement by TEPCO continue to mount.94  Much potential seems to remain for 
further setbacks or negative revelations to reactivate more intense protest activity. 
Of course, the idea that resistance to nuclear power might be leveraged against moves 
toward nuclear weapons with significant effect is rooted in the fact that the nuclear-weapons 
taboo in Japan remains incredibly strong in the first place.95  As noted above, nuclear 
weapons may be the epitome of a high-salience, high-sensitivity political issue.  One cannot 
be pro-nuclear weapon in Japan so much as, at most, open to the option of nuclear weapons.  
The base of support is so fragile that linkage to the separate but highly unpopular issue of 
nuclear power may be damaging enough to dissuade political entrepreneurship. 
A more fundamental geopolitical and alliance shift would likely be necessary for pro-
weapons public opinion to reverse this trend and override both Japan’s traditional nuclear 
taboo and the newly potent linkage to the anti-nuclear-power movement, as well as the 
                                                   
94 See, for example, most recently, Martin Fackler, “Worst Spill in 6 Months Is Reported at 
Fukushima,” The New York Times, 21 February 2014, p. A4. 
95 See, for example, Katsuhisa Furukawa, op. cit. 
  65 
hurdles noted above regarding the “intermediate” steps of Constitutional revision and 
deeper trust of the Self Defense Forces.  If the U.S. were to walk away from its 
“denuclearization” commitments vis-à-vis North Korea, or if the U.S. were to communicate 
a new unwillingness to “stand with Japan” in the Senkaku / Diaoyu dispute, for example, the 
impact might be broad and deep enough to mobilize widespread public-opinion support for 
elite-level policymaking attempts to depart from the non-nuclear status quo.  But, even here, 
such a U.S. withdrawal of commitment would need to take immediate and tangible form – 
for example, failure to act in response to a Chinese move to build structures on disputed 
islands and thereby buttress a claim of sovereignty.  In contrast, moves taken by the U.S. that 
lessen its commitment or capability in the region but in a way only visible to policy and 
military professionals, for example, would have little impact. 
CONCLUSION 
Nuclear weapons policy is complex in all countries, but in Japan it is made especially so by a 
unique and unenviable historical legacy that uncomfortably juxtaposes sincere anti-
proliferation efforts with reliance on the U.S. nuclear deterrent and a robust nuclear power 
industry.  Further, Japan’s traditionally bureaucratic policymaking style has only recently 
begun to grapple with the tumult of genuinely democratic, politically informed input, 
especially in the security policy realm.  New popular (as opposed to unelected) political 
forces – newly emerging types of public opinion and activism coupled with new parties and 
new breeds of leader amid an evolving party system – have begun to assert their right to 
influence policy.  Greater political input on nuclear policy could mean unifying that policy’s 
disparate strands, but just as likely – at least given the “steep learning curve” in the short 
term – is that politicization will also bring trial, error, and volatility. 
Thus far in Japan, though, those with an inclination to impose more genuinely popular 
influence on nuclear policy have not been able to do so, and seem likely not to be able to do 
so in the near future.  In the case of the DPJ, the impetus to impose political leadership was 
thwarted by insufficient organization and policy skill, especially in those security policy areas 
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most visible to the public.  In the meantime, where political leadership was indeed imposed, 
it brought about relatively little change.  In the case of current Prime Minister Abe and the 
LDP, there is sufficient political will and skill to make (comparatively) smaller-scale security 
policy changes, but nuclear policy seems to require too much political capital for any change 
to be likely in the short to medium term.  Party system evolution also mitigates against policy 
change, insofar as it seems to be regressing to LDP dominance.  And at the broader level of 
public opinion, the gradual fading of nuclear taboos and the emergence of a narrow but 
vocal group of more-aggressive nationalists stand to be overpowered by a wave of anti-
nuclear-power activism strong enough to help prevent departures from the nuclear weapons 
status quo as well.   
Overall, the threat of politicization of Japanese nuclear and security policy is genuine, and 
there are enough sources of such politicization that they deserve continued scrutiny.   But 
they remain muted, and they seem to be receding in the short to medium term, even by 
comparison to the recent peak of concern upon the DPJ’s taking power in 2009.  While new 
political forces and policymaking processes will continue to inject added volatility into the 
methods of Japanese nuclear and security policymaking, the fundamental direction and pace of 
that policy is likely to remain stable. 
 
